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A BSTRACT

Large-scale deep neural networks (DNNs) have made breakthroughs in a variety of tasks, such
as image recognition, speech recognition and self-driving cars. However, their large model size
and computational requirements add a significant burden to state-of-the-art computing systems.
Weight pruning is an effective approach to reduce the model size and computational requirements
of DNNs. However, prior works in this area are mainly heuristic methods. As a result, the performance of a DNN cannot maintain for a high weight pruning ratio. To mitigate this limitation,
we propose a systematic weight pruning framework for DNNs based on mathematical optimization. We first formulate the weight pruning for DNNs as a non-convex optimization problem, and
then systematically solve it using alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). Our work
achieves a higher weight pruning ratio on DNNs without accuracy loss and a higher acceleration
on the inference of DNNs on CPU and GPU platforms compared with prior works.
Besides the issue of model size, DNNs are also sensitive to adversarial attacks, a small invisible
noise on the input data can fully mislead a DNN. Research on the robustness of DNNs follows two
directions in general. The first is to enhance the robustness of DNNs, which increases the degree of
difficulty for adversarial attacks to fool DNNs. The second is to design adversarial attack methods
to test the robustness of DNNs. These two aspects reciprocally benefit each other towards hardening DNNs. In our work, we propose to generate adversarial attacks with low distortion via convex
optimization, which achieves 100% attack success rate with lower distortion compared with prior
works. We also propose a unified min-max optimization framework for the adversarial attack and
defense on DNNs over multiple domains. Our proposed method performs better compared with
the prior works, which use average-based strategies to solve the problems over multiple domains.
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C HAPTER 1

I NTRODUCTION

1.1

Background

Large-scale deep neural networks or DNNs have made breakthroughs in many fields, such as image
recognition [3–5], speech recognition [6, 7], game playing [8], and driver-less cars [9]. Despite the
huge success, their large model size and computational requirements will add significant burden
to state-of-the-art computing systems [3, 10, 11], especially for embedded and IoT systems. As
a result, a number of prior works are dedicated to model compression in order to simultaneously
reduce the computation and model storage requirements of DNNs, with minor effect on the overall
accuracy. These model compression techniques include weight pruning [11–15], weight clustering
[11, 16], and low rank approximation [17, 18], etc.
Most of the existing methods on weight pruning are heuristic. For example, some of them prune
the weights based on the magnitude of their value or gradient. However, the importance of weights
can not be determined by their magnitude. Which results in the fact that the heuristic methods
cannot achieve high pruning ratio on DNN without accuracy loss. To mitigate these shortcomings,
we present a systematic framework of weight pruning based on optimization algorithms. First, we
formulate weight pruning as a non-convex optimization problem. By using ADMM, the original
non-convex optimization problem is decomposed into two subproblems that are solved iteratively.
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In the weight pruning problem, one of these subproblems can be solved using stochastic gradient
descent, while the other can be solved analytically. Upon convergence of alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM), we remove the weights which are (close to) zero and retrain the
network. Our extensive numerical experiments indicate that ADMM works very well in practice
and is highly suitable for weight pruning. The weight pruning results consistently outperform prior
works.
Recent research also demonstrates that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, a small
invisible change on an image can change how it is classified. Research on the robustness of DNNs
follows two directions in general. The first is to enhance the robustness of DNNs, which increases
the degree of difficulty for adversarial attacks to fool DNNs [19–22]. The second is to design
adversarial attack methods to test the robustness of DNNs [23–27]. These two aspects reciprocally
benefit each other towards hardening DNNs.
Most adversarial attack generation problems in the literature are solved by first-order gradient descent method. In contrast to these methods, we first formulate adversarial attack on deep
neural networks as a non-convex optimization problem. Then we relax it to a convex problem by
proposing a linear approximation on the activation function. We also designed an algorithm which
iteratively solve the convex problem and prove that upon convergence the solution is feasible for
the original non-convex problem. In experiments, we achieve 100% success rate on neural network
models with lower distortion compared with prior works.
Many problem setups in adversarial attacks and defenses need the optimization in multiple
domains, such as attacking model ensembles [28, 29], devising universal perturbation to input
samples [30] and generalized AT over multiple types of threat models [31, 32]. However, current
methods for solving these tasks often rely on simple heuristics (e.g., uniform averaging). We propose a unified min-max optimization framework on solving these problems, and achieve significant
performance improvements compared with current methods.
In transportation networks, mass enters through source cells and, after being routed through
the network, are removed at sink cells. The flow of mass is subject to (i) conservation of mass
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constraints, and (ii) link capacity constraints. In our work, we study interdiction or attack on transportation networks, which for the sake of concreteness we consider to be highway traffic networks.
Our work follows [1] in formulating the optimal interdiction problem as a min-max optimization
problem and subsequently employing duality to transform it to a standard bilinear optimization
problem. We prove that even without an explicit promotion of sparsity in the formulation, the
solution to the optimal interdiction problem is both sparse and binary. Our numerical experiments
demonstrate that our approach performs better in comparison with methods reported in earlier
work [8].

1.2

Dissertation organization and chapter summaries

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we study a unified DNN
weight pruning framework using ADMM. In chapter 3, a DNN weight pruning method using
reweighted optimization methods is discussed. In Chapter 4, we discuss an adversarial attack generation method via convex programming. In Chapter 5, we propose a unified min-max optimization
framework for adversarial attack and defense over multiple domains. In Chapter 5.7, we study an
optimal interdiction method of transportation networks. In Chapter 6.7, we conclude this thesis
and give directions for future research.
In Chapter 2, we first formulate weight pruning problem on DNNs as an optimization problem
with hard constraints. Then we define indicator functions to integrate the hard constraints into
the objective function. Since the indicator functions are non-differentiable, the problem cannot be
solved directly by SGD [33] or ADAM [34]. To deal with this issue, we propose to decompose the
problem into two subproblems using ADMM. The first subproblem is differentiable and we solve
it using stochastic gradient descent. For the second subproblem, we can efficiently find the closedform solution. We iteratively solve the two subporblems until convergence. In our experiments,
we achieve notably higher pruning rate on different DNNs compared with prior works.
In Chapter 3, we propose a DNN weight pruning method based on reweighted optimization
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methods. For these soft regularization methods, we can decide the degree of sparsity in each
layer based on the distribution of weights after convergence. On one hand, the methods reduce
the complexity of setting hyper-parameters compared with the hard constraint method, in which
the pruning rate in each layer need to be determined at the time when the problem is formulated.
On the other hand, reweighted optimization methods act as the better approximation of `0 norm
and group `0 norm compared with prior soft regularization methods, such as `1 norm and group
Lasso. And in experiments our method achieve higher weight pruning rate without accuracy loss
compared with prior works.
In Chapter 4, we first formulate the adversarial attack generation problem as one with a convex
objective function but non-convex constraints. The non-convexity of the problem comes from the
non-linear activation function in the DNN. However, for piecewise linear activation function such
as Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU), we can first approximate it as a linear function to relax the original
problem to a convex problem. Then we iteratively solve the convex problem until a convergence
condition. We prove that upon the convergence the solution achieved by our method is a feasible
solution of the original non-convex problem, and the corresponding adversarial attacks achieve
100% success rate on the DNN. Our experiment results also demonstrate that our distortion on the
adversarial attacks are lower than the prior works.
In Chapter 5, we propose a unified min-max framework for robust adversarial attacks, we
show how a general notion of min-max optimization over multiple domains can be adapted to
attacking model ensembles, and devising universal perturbation under multiple inputs and data
transformations. We also show how min-max optimization can generalize adversarial training to
a defensive scheme against diversified attack models. Both the generalized attack and defense
problems can be solved via the theoretically-grounded min-max framework.
In Chapter 5.7, we study the optimal interdiction problem of transportation networks. Following the prior work, we first formulate the optimal interdiction problem as a min-max optimization
problem. Then we prove that the solution to the optimal interdiction problem is both sparse and
binary even without an explicit promotion of sparsity in the formulation. We propose a numerical
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method to solve the optimal interdiction problem and it performs better compared with the methods
proposed in earlier work.
In Chapter 6.7, we summarize the results of this thesis, and present several future research
directions.

1.3

Bibliographic note

Most of the research work appearing in this dissertation has already been published at various
venues and has appeared in the publications listed below.
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C HAPTER 2

A U NIFIED DNN W EIGHT P RUNING
F RAMEWORK U SING ADMM

2.1

Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) utilize multiple functional layers cascaded together to extract features at multiple levels of abstraction [3, 6–10], and are thus both computationally and storage
intensive. As a result, many studies on DNN model compression are underway, including weight
pruning [11–15], low-rank approximation [17,18,35], low displacement rank approximation (structured matrices) [36–38], etc. Weight pruning can achieve a high model pruning rate without loss of
accuracy. An early work [11,12] adopts an iterative weight pruning heuristic and results in a sparse
neural network structure. It can achieve 9× weight reduction with no accuracy loss on AlexNet [3].
This weight pruning method has been extended in [13, 15, 39–44] to either use more sophisticated
algorithms to achieve a higher weight pruning rate, or to obtain a fine-grained trade-off between a
higher pruning rate and a lower accuracy degradation.
Despite the promising results, these general weight pruning methods often produce nonstructured and irregular connectivity in DNNs. This leads to degradation in the degree of parallelism and actual performance in GPU and hardware platforms. Moreover, the weight pruning
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rate is mainly achieved through compressing the fully-connected (FC) layers [11, 12, 39], which
are less computationally intensive compared with convolutional (CONV) layers and are becoming
less important in state-of-the-art DNNs such as ResNet [5]. To address these limitations, recent
works [14, 45] have proposed to learn structured sparsity, including sparsity at the levels of filters, channels, filter shapes, layer depth, etc. These works focus on CONV layers and actual GPU
speedup is reported as a result of structured sparsity [14]. However, these structured weight pruning methods are based on fixed regularization techniques and are still quite heuristic [14, 45]. The
weight pruning rate and GPU acceleration are both quite limited. For example, the average weight
pruning rate on CONV layers of AlexNet is only 1.5× without any accuracy loss, corresponding
to 33.3% sparsity.
In this work, we overcome this limitation by proposing a unified, systematic framework of
structured weight pruning for DNNs, named StructADMM, based on the powerful optimization
tool Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) [46, 47] shown to perform well on
combinatorial constraints. It is a unified framework for different types of structured sparsity such
as filter-wise, channel-wise, and shape-wise sparsity, as well as non-structured sparsity. It is a systematic framework of dynamic ADMM regularization and masked mapping and retraining steps,
guaranteeing solution feasibility (satisfying all constraints) and providing high solution quality. It
achieves a significant improvement in weight pruning rate under the same accuracy, along with fast
convergence rate. In the context of deep learning, the StructADMM framework can be understood
as a smart and dynamic regularization technique in which the regularization target is analytically
updated in each iteration.
Beyond the above single-step, one-shot ADMM framework, we observe the opportunity of
performing further weight pruning from the results. This is due to the special property of `2 based ADMM regularization process. This observation suggests a progressive, multi-step model
compression framework using ADMM. In the progressive framework, the pruning result from the
previous step serves as intermediate result and starting point for the subsequent step. It has an
additional benefit of reducing the search space for (structured) weight pruning within each step.
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Detailed procedure and hyperparameter determination process have been carefully designed towards ultra-high weight pruning rates.
During the post-processing procedure, we find that after model retraining, some weights become less contributing to the network performance. To take advantage of this characteristics,
we propose a novel algorithm to detect and remove the redundant weights which slip away from
ADMM (structured) weight pruning. Also, we are the first to discover the unused path in a structured pruned DNN model and design an effective optimization framework to further boost compression rate as well as maintain high network accuracy.

2.2

Related work

General, non-structured weight pruning. The early work by Han et al. [11, 12] achieved 9×
reduction in the number of parameters in AlexNet and 13× in VGG-16. However, most reduction is achieved in FC layers, and 2.7× reduction achieved in CONV layers will not lead to an
overall acceleration in GPU [14]. Extensions of iterative weight pruning, such as [39] (dynamic
network surgery), [13] (NeST) and [48], use more delicate algorithms such as selective weight
growing and pruning. But the weight pruning rates on CONV layers are still limited, e.g., 3.1×
in [39], 3.23× in [13], and 4.16× in [48] for AlexNet with no accuracy degradation. This level
of non-structured weight pruning cannot guarantee GPU acceleration. In fact, our StructADMM
framework can achieve 16.1× non-structured weight pruning in CONV layers of AlexNet without
accuracy degradation, however, only minor GPU acceleration is actually observed.
Structured weight pruning. To overcome the limitation in non-structured, irregular weight
pruning, SSL [14] proposes to learn structured sparsity at the levels of filters, channels, filter
shapes, layer depth, etc. This work is one of the first with actually measured GPU accelerations.
This is because CONV layers after structured pruning will transform to a full matrix multiplication
in GPU (with reduced matrix size). However, the weight pruning rate and GPU acceleration are
both limited. The average weight pruning rate on CONV layers of AlexNet is only 1.5× without
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accuracy loss. The reported GPU acceleration is 49%. Besides, another work [45] achieves 2×
channel pruning with 1% accuracy degradation on VGGNet.
Other types of DNN model compression techniques. There are many other types of DNN
model compression techniques. Weight quantization leverages the inherent redundancy in the number of bits for weight representation. Many of the prior work [49–55] are directed at quantization
of weights to binary values, ternary values, or powers of 2 to facilitate hardware implementations,
with acceptable accuracy loss. The state-of-the-art techniques [56, 57] adopt an iterative quantization and retraining framework, with some degree of randomness incorporated into the quantization
step. This method results in less than 3% accuracy loss on AlexNet for binary weight quantization [57]. Furthermore, knowledge distillation leverages the idea that a smaller student model can
absorb knowledge from the larger teacher model [58–61], low-rank approximation using singlevalue decomposition (SVD) [17, 18, 35], and low-displacement rank approximation using structured matrices such as circulant matrices [36, 62], Toeplitz matrices [37, 38], etc. These techniques
result in a regular network structure, but in general a lower pruning rate and larger accuracy degradation compared with parameter pruning. We point out that these compression techniques are
compatible with ADMM and will be the topic of future investigations orthogonal to this work.
Besides the works we mention above, there are also several representative recent works in
this field. References [63–65] define metrics to measure the importance of the weights, and they
prune the weights which are less important according to their metrics. [66, 67] define optimization
targets to generate sparse DNNs, and they set the optimization target as a regularization term when
they train the DNNs. In these methods, the authors decide the importance of weights on a static
model or setting a static optimization target as the regularization term. However, in our method
the regularization targets are updated dynamically during the training procedure. This is the major
difference between our method and these methods. Note that there are also recent works use
dynamically updated approaches in the training to prune DNNs, such as C-SGD [68] and CNNFCF [69]. C-SGD trains several filters to collapse into a single point in the parameter hyperspace
and than remove the identical filters. CNN-FCF defines dynamically updated binary scalars to
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constraint the filters and remove the filters corresponding to 0-valued scalars after convergence.
Both of the two methods focus only on filter pruning on DNNs, but our framework is unified for
different kind of structured pruning, as well as non-structured pruning.

2.3

Problem statement

Consider an N -layer DNN in which the first M layers are CONV layers and the rest are FC layers.
The weights and biases of the i-th layer are respectively denoted by Wi and bi . Assume that the
input to the DNN is x. Every column of x corresponds to a training image, and the number t of
columns determines the number of training images in the input batch. The input x will enter the
first layer and the output of the first layer is calculated by

h1 = σ(W1 x + b1 ),

where h1 and b1 have t columns, and b1 is a matrix with identical columns. The non-linear
activation function σ(·) acts entrywise on its argument, and is typically chosen to be the ReLU
function [70] in state-of-the-art DNNs. Since the output of one layer is the input of the next, the
output of the i-th layer for i = 2, . . . , N − 1 is given by

hi = σ(Wi hi−1 + bi ).

The output of the DNN corresponding to a batch of images is

s = WN hN −1 + bN .

In this case s is a k × t matrix, where k is the number of classes in the classification, and t is the
number of training images in the batch. The element sij in matrix s is the score of the j-th training
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image corresponding to the i-th class. The total loss of the DNN is calculated as
t

N

j=1

i=1

X
1X
esyj j
f {W1 , . . . , WN }, {b1 , . . . , bN } = −
log Pk
+λ
kWi k2F ,
s
ij
t
i=1 e


where the first term is cross-entropy loss, yj is the correct class of the j-th image, and the second
term is `2 weight regularization.
Hereafter, for simplicity of notation we write {Wi }N
i=1 , or simply {Wi } instead of
{W1 , . . . , WN }. The same notational convention applies other variables and parameters. The
training of a DNN is a process of minimizing the loss by updating weights and biases. If we use
the gradient descent method then the update at every step is

N
∂f {Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1
,
Wi = Wi − α
∂Wi

N
∂f {Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1
bi = bi − α
,
∂bi
computed for i = 1, . . . , N, where α is the learning rate.
In this chapter, our objective is to implement structured pruning on DNNs. In the following
discussion we focus on the CONV layers because they have the highest computation requirements.
More specifically, we minimize the loss function subject to specific structured sparsity constraints
on the weights in the CONV layers, i.e.,

minimize f {Wi }, {bi } ,
{Wi },{bi }

(2.1)

subject to Wi ∈ Si , i = 1, . . . , M,
where Si is the constraint set of weight structure. Next we introduce constraint sets corresponding
to different types of structured sparsity. Non-structured, irregular sparsity is also included in the
framework. The suitability for GPU acceleration is discussed for different types of sparsity, and
we finally introduce the proper combination of structured sparsity to facilitate GPU accelerations.
The details of different types of structures will be discussed later in Section 2.4.1.
In problem (2.1) the constraint is non-convex and combinatorial. As a result, this problem
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cannot be solved directly by stochastic gradient descent methods (SGD) [33] (or ADAM [34]).
However, the property that Wi satisfies certain combinatorial “structures" allows us to integrate
the ADMM framework with stochastic gradient descent to effectively solve this problem.

2.4

A unified DNN weight pruning framework using
ADMM

To apply the ADMM framework, we (i) define indicator functions to incorporate combinatorial
constraints into the objective function, and (ii) define auxilliary variables that allow us to decompose the optimization problem into two subproblems that individually can be solved effectively. In
what follows, we elaborate on these steps.
Corresponding to every set Si , i = 1, . . . , M we define the indicator function

gi (Wi ) =




0

if Wi ∈ Si ,



+∞

otherwise.

Furthermore, we incorporate auxilliary variables Zi , i = 1, . . . , M with the restriction that Zi =
Wi . The original problem (2.1) is then equivalent to

minimize f
{Wi },{bi }

N
{Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1



+

M
X

gi (Zi ),
(2.2)

i=1

subject to Wi = Zi , i = 1, . . . , M.
The augmented Lagrangian [46] of problem (2.2) is defined by
M

 X
N
M
M
N
N
Lρ {Wi }N
,
{b
}
,
{Z
}
,
{Λ
}
=
f
{W
}
,
{b
}
+
gi (Zi )
i i=1
i i=1
i i=1
i i=1
i i=1
i=1
i=1

+

M
X
i=1

tr[ΛTi (Wi

− Zi )] +

M
X
ρi
i=1

2

kWi − Zi k2F ,

where k·kF denotes the Frobenius norm, {Λi }M
i=1 are the dual variables, and the penalty parameters
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{ρi }M
i=1 are positive. With the scaled dual variable Ui = (1/ρi )Λi for i = 1, . . . , M , the augmented
Lagrangian can be equivalently rewritten as
N
M
M
Lρ {Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1 , {Zi }i=1 , {Λi }i=1



= f

N
{Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1



+

M
X

gi (Zi )

i=1

+

M
X
ρi
i=1

2

kWi − Zi + Ui k2F −

M
X
ρi
i=1

2

kUi k2F .

ADMM consists the following iterations for k = 0, 1, . . . [46, 71]:

k+1 N
N
k M
k M
{Wik+1 }N
}i=1 := arg min Lρ {Wi }N
i=1 , {bi
i=1 , {bi }i=1 , {Zi }i=1 , {Ui }i=1 ,

(2.3)


k+1 N
M
k M
{Zk+1
}M
}i=1 , {bk+1
}N
i=1 := arg min Lρ {Wi
i=1 , {Zi }i=1 , {Ui }i=1 ,
i
i

(2.4)

{Wi },{bi }

{Zi }

Uk+1
:= Uki + Wik+1 −Zk+1
f or i = 1, . . . , M,
i
i

(2.5)

until for i = 1, . . . , M , both of the following conditions are satisfied
kWik+1 − Zk+1
k2F ≤ i , kZk+1
− Zki k2F ≤ i
i
i

(2.6)

In order to solve the overall pruning problem, we need to solve subproblems (2.3) and (2.4).
More specifically, problem (2.3) can be formulated as
M
 X
ρi
N
kWi − Zki + Uki k2F ,
minimize f {Wi }N
,
{b
}
+
i i=1
i=1
2
{Wi },{bi }

(2.7)

i=1

where the first term in the objective function of (2.7) is the differentiable loss function of the
DNN, and the second term is a quadratic regularization term of the Wi ’s, which is differentiable
and convex. As a result (2.7) can be solved by stochastic gradient descent. Although we cannot
guarantee the global optimality of the solution, it is due to the non-convexity of the DNN loss
function rather than the quadratic term enrolled by our method.
On the other hand, problem (2.4) is given by

minimize
{Zi }

M
X
i=1

gi (Zi ) +

M
X
ρi
i=1

2

kWik+1 − Zi + Uki k2F .

(2.8)
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Note that gi (·) is the indicator function of Si , thus this subproblem can be solved analytically and
optimally [46]. For i = 1, . . . , M , the optimal solution is

Zk+1
= ΠSi (Wik+1 + Uki ),
i

(2.9)

where ΠSi (·) is Euclidean projection of Wik+1 + Uki onto Si . The set Si is different when we apply
different types of structured sparsity. We will discuss how to implement the Euclidean projection
to different types of structures in Section 2.4.1.

2.4.1

Solutions of different types of structured sparsity and discussions

The collection of weights in the i-th CONV layer is a four-dimensional tensor, i.e., Wi ∈
RAi ×Bi ×Ci ×Di , where Ai , Bi , Ci , and Di are respectively the number of filters, the number of channels in a filter, the height of the filter, and the width of the filter, in layer i. In what follows, if
X denotes the weight tensor in a specific layer, let (X)a,:,:,: denote the a-th filter in X, (X):,b,:,:
denote the b-th channel, and (X):,b,c,d denote the collection of weights located at position (:, b, c, d)
in every filter of X, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Fig. 2.1: Illustration of filter-wise, channel-wise and shape-wise structured sparsity from left to right.

16
Filter-wise structured sparsity: When we train a DNN with sparsity at the filter level, the
constraint on the weights in the i-th CONV layer is given by

Wi ∈ Si := {X | the number of nonzero filters in X is less than or equal to αi }.

Here, nonzero filter means that the filter contains some nonzero weight. To solve subproblem (2.9)
with such constraints, we first calculate

Oa = k(Wik+1 + Uki )a,:,:,: k2F
for a = 1, . . . , Ai . We then keep αi elements in (Wik+1 + Uki )a,:,:,: corresponding to the αi largest
i
values in {Oa }A
a=1 and set the rest to zero.

Channel-wise structured sparsity: When we train a DNN with sparsity at the channel level,
the constraint on the weights in the i-th CONV layer is given by

Wi ∈ Si := {X | the number of nonzero channels in X is less than or equal to βi }.

Here, we call the b-th channel nonzero if (X):,b,:,: contains some nonzero element. To solve subproblem (2.9) with such constraints, we first calculate

Ob = k(Wik+1 + Uki ):,b,:,: k2F
for b = 1, . . . , Bi . We then keep βi elements in (Wik+1 + Uki ):,b,:,: corresponding to the βi largest
i
values in {Ob }B
b=1 and set the rest to zero.

Filter shape-wise structured sparsity: When we train a DNN with sparsity at the filter shape
level, the constraint on the weights in the i-th CONV layer is given by

Bi ,Ci ,Di
Wi ∈ Si := {X | the number of nonzero vectors in {X:,b,c,d }b,c,d=1
is less than or equal to θi }.
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To solve subproblem (2.9) with such constraints, we first calculate

Ob,c,d = k(Wik+1 + Uki ):,b,c,d k2F
for b = 1, . . . , Bi , c = 1, . . . , Ci and d = 1, . . . , Di . We then keep θi elements in (Wik+1 +Uki ):,b,c,d
Bi ,Ci ,Di
corresponding to the θi largest values in {Ob,c,d }b,c,d=1
and set the rest to zero.

Non-structured, irregular weight sparsity: When we train a DNN with non-structured weight
sparsity, the constraint on the weights in i-th CONV layer is

Wi ∈ Si := {X | the number of nonzero elements in X is less than or equal to γi }.
To solve subproblem (2.9), we keep γi elements in Wik+1 + Uki with largest magnitudes and set
the rest to zero.
Combination of structured sparsity to facilitate GPU acceleration: Convolutional computations in DNNs are commonly transformed to matrix multiplications by converting weight tensors
and feature map tensors to matrices [72], named general matrix multiplication or GEMM. Filterwise sparsity corresponds to row pruning, whereas channel-wise and filter shape-wise sparsity
correspond to column pruning in GEMM. The GEMM matrix maintains a full matrix with number
of rows/columns reduced, thereby enabling GPU acceleration. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2, in
which Wn,m,k means the k-th element in the m-th channel of the n-th filter. In the results we will
use row pruning to represent the results of filter-wise sparsity in GEMM, and use column pruning
to represent the results of channel-wise and filter shape-wise sparsity.

2.4.2

The masked retraining step

For very small values of i in (2.6), ADMM needs a large number of iterations to converge. However, in many applications, such as the weight pruning problem considered here, a slight increase
in the value of i can result in a significant speedup in convergence. On the other hand, when
ADMM stops early the weights to be pruned may not be identically zero, in the sense that there
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Fig. 2.2: Illustration of 2D weight matrix for GEMM (left) and row-wise and column-wise sparsity (right)

will be small nonzero elements contained in Wi . To deal with this issue, we first perform the Euclidean projection to guarantee that the structured pruning constraints are satisfied. Next, we mask
the zero weights and retrain the DNN with non-zero weights using training sets (while keeping
the masked weights 0). In this way test accuracy (solution quality) can be partially restored. Note
that the convergence is much faster than training the original DNN, since the starting point of the
retraining is already close to the point which can achieve the original test/validation accuracy.

2.4.3

Overall illustration of our proposed framework

We take the weight distribution of every (convolutional or fully connected) layer on LeNet-5 as an
example to illustrate our systematic weight pruning method. The weight distributions at different
stages are shown in Figure 2.3. The subfigures in the left column show the weight distributions
of the pretrained model, which serves as our starting point. The subfigures in the middle column
show that after the convergence of ADMM for moderate values of i , we observe a clear separation
between weights whose values are close to zero and the remaining weights. To prune the weights
rigorously, we set the values of the close-to-zero weights exactly to zero and retrain the DNN
without updating these values. The subfigures in the right column show the weight distributions
after our final retraining step. We observe that most of the weights are zero in every layer. This
concludes our weight pruning procedure.
As mentioned before, the computation time for the ADMM procedure is similar to the training
of the original DNN, and the single retraining step converges much faster than the original training.
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Fig. 2.3: Weight distribution of every (convolutional or fully connected) layer on LeNet-5. The subfigures
in the left column are the weight distributions of the pretrained DNN model (serving as our starting point);
the subfigures of the middle column are the weight distributions after the ADMM procedure; the subfigures
of the right column are the weight distributions after our final retraining step. Note that the subfigures in the
last column include a small number of nonzero weights that are not clearly visible due to the large number
of zero weights.
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Algorithm 1 An overall illustration of our proposed StructADMM framework
Input: Pretrained model
Initialize {Z0i } and {U0i }
Set j = 0 and k = 0.
Set T as the number of iterations of ADMM
Set β as the number of epochs in every iteration of ADMM
for k ≤ T do
for j ≤ β do
Solve problem (2.7) using one epoch of SGD or ADAM
end for
Update {Zk+1
} according to (2.9)
i
k+1
Update {Ui } according to (2.5)
if Condition (2.6) is satisfied then
Break for loop
end if
end for
Perform the Euclidean projection according to (2.9) to guarantee that the structured pruning
constraints are satisfied. Then mask the zero weights and retrain the DNN with the non-zero
weights.
Consequently, the total computation time of our method is less than training the original DNN
twice, which is much faster than the iterative pruning and training method in [73]. An overall
illustration of our proposed StructADMM framework is shown in Algorithm 1.

2.5
2.5.1

Methods to improve pruning rate
Progressive DNN weight pruning

The first motivation of the progressive framework is that during the implementation of the singlestep weight pruning framework, we observe that there are a number of unpruned weights with
values very close to zero. The reason is the `2 regularization nature in ADMM regularization step,
which tends to generate very small, non-zero weight values even when they are not pruned. As
the remaining number of non-zero weights is already significantly reduced during weight pruning,
simply mapping these small-value weights to zero will result in accuracy degradation. On the other
hand, this motivates us to perform weight pruning in a multi-step, progressive manner. The weights
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that have been pruned in the previous step will be masked and only the remaining, non-zero weights
will be considered in the subsequent step.
The second motivation of the progressive framework is to reduce the search space for weight
pruning within each step. After all, weight pruning problems are essentially combinatorial optimizations. Although recently demonstrated to generate superior results on this type of problems [74, 75], ADMM-based solution still has a superlinear increase of computational complexity
as a function of solution space. As a result, the complexity becomes very high with ultra-high
compression rates (i.e., very large search space) beyond what can be achieved in prior work. The
progressive framework, on the other hand, can mitigate this limitation and reduce the total training
time (to 2× or slightly higher than training time of the original DNN).
Similar approach that masking the zero weights in the model generated from the previous
iteration of pruning has been applied in [12, 42], but our motivation is different from these works.
Magnitude-based pruning method is used in [12, 42] , this method is heuristic and the pruning rate
have to be iteratively increased to avoid accuracy loss. One-step of our ADMM-based method can
achieve much higher pruning rate than iterative magnitude-based pruning method without accuracy
loss. And our major purpose of using progressive method is to reduce the search space in each step
to achieve ultra-high pruning rate.
Also, masking the zero weights is not necessary for our method to reduce the search space. In
our experiment we find that even if we do not mask the zero weights pruned in each step when we
start a new step, the value of the unimportant weights still keep close to zero. This is because the
ADMM-based regularization term prevent these unimportant weights to move away from zero. In
conclusion, if we start from a model which is already pruned, the search space for our ADMMbased method is being reduced no matter if we mask the zero weights or not. We choose to mask
the zero weights to make the training more rigorous.
Figure 2.4 illustrates our proposed progressive DNN weight pruning method on StructADMM
framework. The single-step ADMM-based weight pruning is performed multiple times, each as a
step in the progressive framework. The pruning results from the previous step serve as intermediate
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Fig. 2.4: An illustration our proposed progressive DNN weight pruning method on StructADMM framework.

results and starting point for the subsequent step. Through extensive investigations, we conclude
that a two-step progressive procedure will be in general sufficient for weight pruning, in which
each step requires approximately the same number of training epochs as original DNN training.
Further increase in the number of steps or the number of epochs in each step will result in only
marginal improvement in the overall solution quality (e.g., 0.1%-0.2% accuracy improvement).

2.5.2

Network purification and unused path removal

After ADMM-based structured weight pruning, we propose the network purification and unused
path removal step for further weight reduction without accuracy loss. First, as also noticed by prior
work [45], a specific filter in layer i is responsible for generating one channel in layer i + 1. As
a result, removing the filter in layer i (in fact removing the batch norm results) also results in the
removal of the corresponding channel, thereby achieving further weight reduction. Besides this
straightforward procedure, there is further margin of weight reduction based on the characteristics
of ADMM regularization. As ADMM regularization is essentially a dynamic, `2 -norm based regularization procedure, there are a large number of non-zero, small weight values after regularization.
Due to the non-convex property in ADMM regularization, our observation is that removing these
weights can maintain the accuracy or even slightly improve the accuracy occasionally. As a result,
we define two thresholds, a column-wise threshold and a filter-wise threshold, for each DNN layer.
When the `2 norm of a column (or filter) of weights is below the threshold, the column (or filter)
will be removed. Also the corresponding channel in layer i + 1 can be removed upon filter removal
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in layer i. Structures in each DNN layer will be maintained after this purification step.

2.6
2.6.1

Numerical results
Experiment results for structure pruning

First, we compare our method with the two configurations of the SSL method [14] on
AlexNet/CaffeNet. The first has no accuracy degradation (Top-1 error 42.53%) and average sparsity of 33.3% on conv2-conv5. We note that the 1st CONV layer of AlexNet/CaffeNet is very
small with only 35K weights compared with 2.3M in conv2-conv5, and is often not the optimization focus [14, 35]. The second has around 2% accuracy degradation (Top-1 error 44.66%) with
total sparsity of 84.4% on conv2-conv5. The first configuration focuses on column sparsity only.
The second configuration focuses on a combined row (filter) and column sparsity.
Table 2.1 shows the comparison of our method with the first configuration of SSL. We generate
configuration with no accuracy degradation compared with original model (the original model of
our work is higher than that in SSL). We can achieve a much higher degree of sparsity of 79.2%
on conv2-conv5. This corresponds to 4.8× weight pruning rate, which is significantly higher
compared with 1.5× pruning in conv2-conv5 in [14].
Table 2.1: Comparison of our method and SSL method on column sparsity without accuracy loss on
AlexNet/CaffeNet model for ImageNet data set

Method

Top-1 Acc
Loss

SSL [14]

0%

our method

0%

Statistics

conv1 conv2 conv3 conv4 conv5 conv2-5

column
sparsity
pruning
rate
column
sparsity
GPU1×
GPU2×
pruning
rate

0.0%

20.9% 39.7% 39.7% 24.6% 33.3%

1.0×

1.3×

0.0%

70.0% 77.0% 85.0% 81.0% 79.2%

1.7×

1.7×

1.3×

1.5×

1.00× 2.27× 3.35× 3.64× 1.04× 2.58×
1.00× 2.83× 3.92× 4.63× 3.22× 3.65×
1.0× 3.3× 4.3× 6.7× 5.3× 4.8×
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Table 2.2: Comparison of our method and SSL method on column and row sparsity with less than 2%
accuracy loss on AlexNet/CaffeNet for ImageNet data set

Method

Top-1 Acc
Loss

SSL [14]

2.0%

our method

our method

§

0.7%

2.0%

Statistics

conv1 conv2 conv3 conv4 conv5 conv2-5

column
sparsity
row sparsity
pruning
rate
column
sparsity
row sparsity
CPU×
GPU1×
GPU2×
pruning
rate
column
sparsity
row sparsity
CPU×
GPU1×
GPU2×
pruning
rate

0.0%

63.2% 76.9% 84.7% 80.7%

9.4%

12.9% 40.6% 46.9% 0.0%

1.1×

3.2×

0.0%

63.9% 78.1% 87.0% 84.9%

9.4%

12.9% 40.6% 46.9% 0.0%

1.05×
1.00×
1.00×
1.1×

2.82×
1.28×
2.34×
3.1×

0.0%

87.5% 90.0% 90.5% 90.7%

9.4%

12.9% 40.6% 46.9% 0.0%

1.05×
1.00×
1.00×
1.1×

8.00×
2.39×
4.92×
9.2×

7.7×

6.63×
4.31×
6.85×
7.3×

14.68×
5.34×
12.55×
16.8×

12.3× 5.2×

10.16×
1.75×
6.99×
14.5×

14.22×
1.92×
8.39×
19.8×

5.00×
1.52×
4.15×
6.6×

7.71×
2.04×
6.02×
8.4×

84.4%§

6.4×
86.3%§

6.16×
2.29×
5.13×
7.3×
93.7%§

11.93×
3.15×
8.52×
15.0×

Total sparsity accounting for both column and row sparsity.

We test the actual GPU accelerations using two GPUs: GPU1 is NVIDIA 1080Ti and GPU2
is NVIDIA TX2. The acceleration rate is computed with respect to the corresponding layer of
the original DNN executing on the same GPU and same setup. One can observe that the average
acceleration of conv2-conv5 on 1080Ti is 2.58×, while the average acceleration on TX2 is 3.65×.
These results clearly outperform the GPU acceleration of 49% reported in SSL [14] without accuracy loss, as well as the more recent work [35]. The acceleration rate on TX2 is higher than
1080Ti because the latter has a high parallelism degree, which will not be fully utilized when the
matrix size GEMM of a CONV layer is significantly reduced. Another technique cuDNN can use
implicit GEMM for better performance than cuBLAS, but we still outperform it on the inference
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Table 2.3: Structured pruning results on ResNet-18 model for ImageNet data set.

Method
Original
DCP [66]
DCP [66]
Our method (column prune)
Our method (filter + column prune)

Prune rate
1.0×
1.5×
2.0×
2.5×
3.0×

Top 5 accuracy
89.0%
88.9%
87.6%
89.0%
88.7%

Table 2.4: Structured pruning results on ResNet-50 model for ImageNet data set.

Method
Original
ThiNet-50 [76]
ThiNet-30 [76]
NISP [63]
Efficient ConvNet [64]
DCP [66]
Our method (filter prune)
Our method (filter + column prune)

Prune rate
1.0×
2.0×
3.3×
1.8×
1.4×
2.0×
2.7×
2.7×

Top 5 accuracy
92.7%
90.0%
88.3%
90.2%
91.1%
92.3%
91.9%
92.3%

time without accuracy loss. For example, We compare our result in Table 2.1 to the baseline results with cuDNN, our inference time with cuBLAS is also 2.8x lower than the result with baseline
cuDNN on original, uncompressed DNN on TX2 GPU.
Table 2.2 shows the comparison with the second configuration of SSL. With similar (and
slightly higher) sparsity in each layer as SSL, we can achieve less accuracy loss. With the same
relative accuracy loss (a moderate accuracy loss within 2% compared with original DNN), a higher
degree of 93.7% average sparsity of conv2-conv5 is achieved, translating into 15.0× weight pruning. The actual GPU acceleration results are also high: 3.15× on 1080Ti and 8.52× on TX2. One
can clearly see that the speedup on 1080Ti saturates because the high parallelism degree cannot
be fully exploited. The acceleration on CPU can be higher under this setup, reaching 11.93× on
average on conv2-conv5.
Figure 2.5 shows the convergence behavior of ADMM regularization (in StructADMM frame-
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Fig. 2.5: Convergence behavior of the ADMM regularization procedure for the convolutional layers 2-5 of
AlexNet.

work, single-step ADMM), using the experiment that achieves 4.8× structured pruning rate on
AlexNet without accuracy loss. We can observe that ADMM regularization converges in around
12 iterations. The number of ADMM iterations is generally 9 - 12 for most of test cases. In each
iteration, we need around 10% to 20% of the number of epochs as original DNN training.
Additionally, in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4, we demonstrate the structured (filter or column) pruning results on ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 models for ImageNet data set. We compare with a list of
prior work, and these prior work focus on filter pruning only (we do not find prior work on column
pruning on these two models). As shown in the tables, we achieve simultaneously higher pruning
rate (weight parameter reduction rate) and higher accuracy compared with prior work, when only
applying filter (row) pruning. Also, we can observe that column pruning results in higher pruning
rate and/or higher accuracy compared with filter pruning. This is because of the higher flexibility in
column pruning by modifying filter shapes. For large-scale GPU/CPU acceleration when GEMM
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computation is utilized, column pruning (and potentially effective combination with filter pruning)
will be more effective than filter pruning only.

2.6.2

Experiment results for non-structured pruning

We evaluate our method for non-structured pruning on AlexNet and VGG-16 for ImageNet data
set. Since we propose a progressive, multi-step weight pruning framework, we achieve a higher
pruning rate than the single-step ADMM method in the early version of our work [77] on AlexNet.
We also achieve much higher pruning rate compared with other prior work.
Table 2.5: Comparisons of weight pruning results on AlexNet model for ImageNet data set.

Method
Top-5 Acc.
Uncompressed
80.3%
Network Pruning [73]
80.3%
Optimal Brain Surgeon [40]
80.0%
Low Rank and Sparse Decomposition [78]
80.3%
Fine-Grained Pruning [48]
80.4%
NeST [13]
80.2%
Dynamic Surgery [39]
80.0%
Single-step ADMM [77]
80.2%
Hoyer-Square [67]
80.2%
Progressive Weight Pruning
80.2%
Progressive Weight Pruning
80.0%

No. Para.
61.0M
6.7M
6.7M
6.1M
5.1M
3.9M
3.4M
2.9M
2.86M
2.02M
1.97M

Rate
1×
9×
9.1×
10×
11.9×
15.7×
17.7×
21×
21.3×
30×
31×

Table 2.6: Comparisons of weight pruning results on VGG-16 model for ImageNet data set.

Method
Top-5 Acc.
Uncompressed
88.7%
Network Pruning [73]
89.1%
Optimal Brain Surgeon [40]
89.0%
Low Rank and Sparse Decomposition [78]
89.1%
Progressive Weight Pruning
88.7%
Progressive Weight Pruning
88.2%

No. Para.
138M
10.6M
10.3M
9.2M
4.6M
4.1M

Rate
1×
13×
13.3×
15×
30×
34×

Table 2.5 presents the weight pruning comparison results on the AlexNet model between our
proposed method and prior work. Our weight pruning results clearly outperform the prior work, in
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that we can achieve 31× weight reduction rate without loss of accuracy. Our progressive weight
pruning also outperforms the single-step ADMM weight pruning in [77] that achieves 21× compression rate.
Table 2.6 presents the comparison results on VGG-16. These weight pruning results we
achieved clearly outperform the prior work, consistently achieving the highest sparsity in the
benchmark DNN models. On the VGG-16 model, we achieve 30× weight pruning with comparable accuracy with prior work, while the highest pruning rate in prior work is 19.5×. We also
achieve 34× weight pruning with minor accuracy loss.
In summary, the experimental results demonstrate that our framework applies to a broad set
of representative DNN models and consistently outperforms the prior work. It also applies to the
DNN models that consist of mainly convolutional layers, which are different with weight pruning
for prior methods. These promising results will significantly contribute to the energy-efficient
implementation of DNNs in mobile and embedded systems, and on various hardware platforms.

2.7

Summary

In this chapter, we proposed a unified, systematic framework of structured weight pruning for
DNNs. It is a unified framework for different types of structured sparsity such as filter-wise,
channel-wise, shape-wise sparsity as well as non-structured sparsity. By incorporating stochastic
gradient descent with ADMM, our framework updates regularization target analytically in each
iteration. Based on ADMM, we further propose a progressive weight pruning framework and a
network purification and unused path removal procedure, in order to achieve higher pruning rate
without accuracy loss. In our experiments, we achieve 2.58× and 3.65× measured speedup on two
GPUs without accuracy loss. The speedups reach 3.18× and 8.52× on GPUs and 10.5× on CPU
when allowing moderate accuracy loss of 2%, and reaches 7.6× on the Adreno 640 mobile GPU.
Our pruning rate and speedup clearly outperform prior work.
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C HAPTER 3

A U NIFIED DNN W EIGHT P RUNING
F RAMEWORK U SING R EWEIGHTED
O PTIMIZATION M ETHODS

3.1

Introduction

DNNs have achieved impressive results in many fields including image classification [3], natural
language processing [6], autonomous vehicles [79], etc. The state-of-the-art DNNs have large
model size and computational requirement, which impedes the critical requirements (e.g., real
time, low power) in the inference phase. To address these challenges, prior works have focused on
developing DNN model compression techniques, such as weight pruning [12, 14, 39, 77].
The objective of DNN weight pruning is to reduce the number of non-zero elements in the
weight matrix while maintaining the prediction accuracy. Early works in weight pruning utilize
a static, magnitude-based method [12] or `1 -based regularization [14] to explore sparsity in DNN
models. Although these methods can prune the weights without accuracy loss, they are heuristic
and can only find a small parts of non-critical weights to prune. To overcome the accuracy degradation while further prune the DNNs, several works [66, 69, 80, 81] propose more well-developed
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methods to increase the pruning rate based on the sparsity types proposed by [14]. Recently,
reference [77] used the alternating direction method of multiplier (ADMM) [82] to solve the `0
constraint problem and achieve good performance on pruning rate without accuracy loss. With
the powerful ADMM optimization framework, pruning problems are re-formed into optimization problems with the dynamically updated regularization terms bounded by the designated hard
constraint sets which enable arbitrary desired pruning dimensions to fulfill the vast design space.
However, ADMM suffers from long convergence time due to the strong non-convexity of the `0
constraints. Additionally, it is a highly time-consuming process to set the hyperparameters manually in a hard constraints problem, which intrinsically is a heuristic exploration that mainly relies
on the experiences of the designer, and the derived hyperparameters are typically sub-optimal. It
is imperative to find a better solution to solve the pruning problem with high efficient and selfadaptive regularization that can automatically determine pruning hyperparameters and maintain
accuracy.
In this paper, we propose a unified DNN weight pruning framework with dynamically updated
regularization terms bounded by the designated constraint, which can generate both non-structured
sparsity and different kinds of structured sparsity. In non-structured pruning, we need to reduce
the `0 norm of the weight matrix, but it is an intractable problem since `0 norm is non-convex and
discrete. To deal with this issue, we solve the reweighted `1 problem [83] as the proxy of `0 problem. Structured pruning requires not only the sparsity in weights but also the position of the zeros
elements. To generate different kinds of group sparsity, we propose to use a reweighted method on
group lasso regularization. In our proposed framework, we first use a reweighted method to regularize the model, then remove the weights which are close to zero and mask the gradient of these
weights to ensure that they no longer update. We retrain the remaining non-zero weights to retrieve
the accuracy. We adopt the reweighted regularization method with designated sparsity types, which
avoids strongly non-convex `0 -norm based hard constraints in the state-of-the-art ADMM formulation, therefore accelerates the convergence and reduces the number of hyperparameters. Since the
loss function of DNNs is non-convex, when we use the reweighted method we also need to solve
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a non-convex problem and cannot achieve the globally optimal solution. This motivates us to use
the reweighted method again on the sparse model achieved in our first step. After implementing
the reweighted method for several more steps, we achieve higher pruning rate.
For both non-structured and structured pruning, our method achieve higher pruning rate than
state-of-the-arts while maintaining accuracy. For non-structured pruning, we achieve 630× pruning rate on LeNet-5 for MNIST and 45× pruning rate on AlexNet for ImageNet with minor accuracy loss. For structured pruning, we achieve 4.2× and 3.2× pruning rate on the convolutional layers of ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 for ImageNet and 7.2× on the convolutional layers of
MobileNet-V2-1.0 for CIFAR-10 with negligible accuracy loss.

3.2
3.2.1

Related work
Static regularization-based pruning

Early works in weight pruning utilize a static, magnitude-based method or `1 -based regularization
to explore sparsity in DNN models. With specified regularization dimensions on weight vectors,
we can perform different types of pruning method including non-structured pruning and structured pruning, but with limited compression rates and non-negligible accuracy degradation due to
the intrinsically heuristic and non-optimized approach. Non-structured pruning in [12, 84] iteratively prunes weights at arbitrary location based on their magnitude, resulting in a sparse model
to be stored in the compressed sparse column (CSC) format. Although this method achieves 12×
pruning rate on LeNet-5 using MNIST dataset and 9× pruning rate on AlexNet using ImageNet
dataset, it leads to an undermined processing throughput because the indices in the compressed
weight representation cause stall or complex workload on highly parallel architectures. To overcome the limitation of the general non-structured weight pruning, recent works [14, 66] proposed
to incorporate regularity or “structures" in weight pruning, including filter pruning, channel pruning, and filter shape pruning. Structured pruning targets at generating regular and smaller weight
matrices based on `1 regularization to eliminate overhead of weight indices and achieve higher
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acceleration in CPU/GPU executions. The weight matrix will maintain a full matrix but with reduced dimensions, and indices are no longer needed. As a result, it leads to much higher speedups.
However, it suffers from notable accuracy loss due to the poor solution quality.

3.2.2

Dynamic regularization-based pruning

Flourished by [77, 80, 85–87] with the powerful ADMM [82] optimization framework, pruning
problems are re-formed into optimization problems with the dynamically updated regularization
terms bounded by the designated constraint (i.e., pruning with specific dimensions or with any desired weight matrix shapes) sets that involved into loss function during DNN training. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the ADMM approach decomposes an original pruning problem into
two subproblems, in which one can be solved by standard stochastic gradient decent (SGD) while
the other one can be solved by iteratively updating regularization terms with ADMM steps, thus
facilitates very high weight reduction and promising accuracy. Same as static regularization-based
pruning, the dynamic regularization-based pruning also achieves non-structured sparsity in [77,85]
and structured sparsity in [80, 87], but with significantly improved accuracy and compression results. In addition, it also achieves special pruning dimension such as hybrid sparsity studied in [86]
which can not be obtained by former. ADMM can effectively deal with a subset of combinatorial
constraints and yields high quality solutions, which associated constraints in the DNN weight pruning belong to this subset of combinatorial constraints, making ADMM applicable to DNN mode
compression and achieves non-structured 246× compression on LeNet-5 with MNIST, 36× on
AlexNet with ImageNet and structured 4.8× on AlexNet and 2× on ResNet-18 with ImageNet.

3.3

Problem statement

We observe that many early works use static methods on the weight pruning of DNNs, e.g. the
magnitude based methods in [12] and the `1 regularization method in [14]. We propose two hypotheses based on these methods. First, some weights with small magnitude are critical to maintain
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Fig. 3.1: Comparisons of the distribution of all weights and critical weights (remaining weights after
pruning) in the second fully connected layer (FC-2) of a pretrained AlexNet model and `1 regularized model.
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Fig. 3.2: Weight distribution of all layers in AlexNet after our reweighted `1 regularization method

the accuracy of the model, thus we cannot prune the weights simply based on their magnitude. Second, the `1 norm is not a good approximation of the `0 norm, and using the `1 regularization will
penalize some critical weights to values close to zero. These two hypotheses motivate us to find
a better approximation for the `0 norm in order to generate highly sparse model without accuracy
loss.
We prune an AlexNet using the reweighted method to verify our two hypotheses. Fig. 3.1 shows
the histogram of the weights in the second fully connected layer (FC-2) of AlexNet. In Fig. 3.1 (a),
the red area is the histogram of the original weight distribution without pruning (we omit the top
part of the distribution due to space limitations), and the blue area is the distribution after removing
97.9% of the weights by the reweighted method without accuracy loss. We can observe that the
critical weights (remaining weights after pruning) are approximately uniformly distributed, which
means that some weights with small magnitude are also critical. This verifies our first hypothesis.
In Fig. 3.1 (b), the red area is the histogram of the weights after regularizing the FC-2 layer using `1
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regularization. Comparing with the red area of Fig. 3.1 (a), `1 regularization reduces the magnitude
of the weights in the entire network. The critical weights, shown in the blue area of Fig. 3.1 (a),
have a different distribution after `1 regularization is applied, as shown in the blue area of Fig. 3.1
(b). It is clear that `1 regularization penalizes a lot more critical weights towards zero, as is shown
in the high peak of the blue area. After pruning, those critical weights will be forced to zero, and
thus may negatively impact the model quality. This is because `1 regularization casts equal penalty
on all weights or weight groups. This violates the original intention of weight pruning, which is to
remove the “non-critical" weights instead of “small" weights, thus it is not a good approximation
for `0 regularization, which verifies our second hypothesis.
Besides static methods used in the early works, a recent work [77] focuses on `0 norm based
optimization with an ADMM-based hard constraint approach and achieves good performance on
DNN pruning without accuracy loss. This method first formulates weight pruning as an optimization problem with a hard constraint on `0 norm, and then uses ADMM [82] to solve the problem.
In the ADMM-based solution framework, the regularization term is dynamically updated in each
iteration, and it achieves better performance compared with the work based on static methods.
However, because of the hard constraint on the `0 norm, the degree of sparsity in each DNN layer
needs to be pre-specified. This fact limits the flexibility of the ADMM-based method. In reality,
when the degree of sparsity undefined, it is hard to determine the numbers of weights to prune for
each layer. Therefore, ADMM-based method may take an excessive amount of time to tune the
parameters to achieve the desired pruning rate without accuracy loss.
In this paper, we propose to use a reweighted method for DNN weight pruning. It is a dynamic
regularization-based method, where in each iteration the penalties on different weights are dynamically updated. Different from the ADMM-based method in which the hyperparameters need to be
tuned, we only need to set a single penalty parameter in our method, the value of this parameter is
easy to set and we will discuss it in Section 3.5.After training with our reweighted regularization
method, we can decide the degree of sparsity in each layer based on the distribution of weights. For
example, the weight distribution of each layer in AlexNet after our reweighted `1 regularization
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method is shown in Fig. 3.2. We can observe that most of the weights with large magnitude are distributed in the range of 0.01 to 0.1, and most of the weights with small magnitude are smaller than
0.0001. This means small weights are 100× or more smaller than large weights. Thus, removing
the weights with magnitude smaller than 0.0001 has a minor effect on the accuracy of the DNN.
Meanwhile, we do not need to specify the pruning rate for each layer as it will be determined dynamically by our proposed reweighted regularization method. Note that our method is essentially
different from magnitude-based method. Magnitude-based method directly removes the part of
weights with small magnitude. While in our method, the weights are divided into two parts based
on the magnitude after the DNN is trained with reweighted regularization method. And one part
of the weights is significantly smaller than the other part. We only remove the part of significantly
small weights which have minor contribution for the DNN. However, some of the small weights
removed by magnitude-based method have critical contribution to the DNN.

3.3.1

Non-structured pruning

Consider an N -layer DNN, the weights and biases of the i-th layer is respectively denoted by Wi
and bi , and the collection of weights and biases of all the layers is respectively denoted by {Wi }N
i=1

N
N
and {bi }N
i=1 . The loss function associated with the DNN is denoted by f {Wi }i=1 , {bi }i=1 . In
DNN training, we minimize the loss function to increase the accuracy. For the non-structured
weight pruning problem, our aim is to reduce the number of non-zero elements in the weight
matrix while maintaining the accuracy. Therefore, we need to minimize the summation of the loss
function and the `0 regularization term as follows,
minimize f
{Wi },{bi }

N 
{Wi }N
i=1 , {bi }i=1

+λ

N
X

kWi k`0 ,

i=1

where λ is the penalty parameter to adjust the relative importance of accuracy and sparsity.
The problem with the `0 norm is intractable, thus we use a reweighted `1 method [83] to approximate the `0 norm. For the reweighted `1 method, we instead solve the problem
N
X

(l)
N
minimize f {Wi }N
,
{b
}
+
λ
kPi ◦ Wi k`1 ,
i i=1
i=1
{Wi },{bi }

i=1

(3.1)
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(l)

(l)

(l)

where R(Pi , Wi ) = kPi ◦ Wi k`1 , the operator ◦ denotes element-wise multiplication, and Pi

is the collection of penalties on different weights, which is updated in every iteration to increase
the degree of sparsity beyond the `1 norm regularization. In each iteration, we denote the solution
(l)

of Wi by Wi

(l+1)

and update Pi by setting Pi

=

1
,
(l)
|W i |+

where | · | denotes the absolute value

and  is a small parameter to avoid dividing by zero. In our experiment  = 0.001 works well. All
operations above are performed element-wise.

3.3.2

Structured pruning

Filter-wise pruning and shape-wise pruning are a subset of structured pruning. Different from
non-structured pruning, structured pruning requires not only the sparsity in weights but also the
position of the zeros elements [14]. To generate different kinds of group sparsity, we propose to
use the reweighted method on the group lasso regularization [88]. Problem (3.1) is also applicable
to structured pruning. For filter-wise pruning, the regularization term is
(l)
R(Pi , Wi )

=

A
X

(l)

kPi,a ◦ (Wi )a,:,:,: k2F ,

a=1
(l+1)

where (Wi )a,:,:,: denotes the a-th filter of Wi , and Pi,a is updated by Pi,a

=

1
.
k(Wi )la,:,:,: k2F +

For shape-wise pruning, the regularization term is

(l)
R(Pi , Wi )

=

C X
D
B X
X

(l)

kPi,b,c,d ◦ (Wi ):,b,c,d k2F ,

b=1 c=1 d=1

where (Wi ):,b,c,d denotes the collection of weights located at position (:, b, c, d) in every filter and
(l+1)

Pi is updated by Pi,b,c,d =

3.4

1
.
k(Wi )l:,b,c,d k2F +

A unified algorithm for non-structured and structured
sparsity

In [83], the reweighted `1 method initializes all the penalties on different weights to one. In our
problem, since we have pretrained models, we initialize Pi using the parameters Wi in the pre-
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Algorithm 2 Unified reweighted method on DNN pruning
Input: pretrained model
Initialize Pi
Set l = 1
Set T as the number of iterations of the reweighted method
for l ≤ T do
Solve the regularization Problem (3.1) using SGD or ADAM
(l+1)
(l)
Update Pi
using the solution of Wi
end for
Remove the weights (or group of weights) which are close to zeros and retrain the DNN using
the non-zero weights
trained model. We use SGD or ADAM [34] to solve the regularization problem (3.1). We set
the parameters of the pretrained model as the starting point of the first iteration of the reweighted
method, and we set the solution obtained after one iteration of the reweighted method as the starting point of the next iteration. The above approaches we used (the way to initialize Pi and set
starting point) can reduce the total computational time in the reweighted method. After using the
reweighted method, we remove the weights (or group of weights) that are close to zero and retrain
the DNN using the remaining non-zero weights. Algorithm 2 summarizes a single step of our
proposed method.
Then we mask the gradients of the weights we already set to zeros (these zero weights will no
longer change), and use reweighted method to generate further sparsity based on the model found
in the first step. We observe that after the first step, we obtain a sparse model with sparsity larger
than state-of-the-art works [77, 85]. However, we can further increase the degree of sparsity by
using the reweighted method repeatedly.
Since the loss function in the regularization problem is non-convex, we cannot find the globally
optimum of this problem. This impacts the performance of the reweighted method to search for a
model with high degree of sparsity in a single step. However, if we use the single step repeatedly,
we can keep the balance between the degree of sparsity and accuracy of the model in each step.
Then we can finally achieve a highly sparse model without accuracy loss. More specifically, we use
a moderate λ and apply the reweighted method for several steps, and thus obtain a highly sparse
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model with competitive accuracy.

3.5

Numerical results

In this section, we evaluate our proposed framework for both non-structured pruning and structured
pruning on different DNN models. We implement our non-structured pruning method on AlexNet
[3] models for ImageNet ILSVRC-2012 dataset. We also implement our structured pruning method
on ResNet-18 and ResNet-50 [5] models for ImageNet dataset, and MobileNet-V2-1.0 [89] model
for CIFAR-10 dataset.
For the penalty parameter λ, it is used for adjusting the relative importance of accuracy and
sparsity. Excessively small λ fails to regularize enough non-critical weights to values close to
zero and excessively large λ is fails to minimize the loss function and the model accuracy cannot
be maintained. In our experiment we find an appropriate way to tune λ. In the regularization
problems (3.1), when we adjust λ to set the value of the regularization term in the range of
4l ≤ λ

N
X

(1)

(0)

R(Pi , Wi ) ≤ 8l,

i=1
(0)

we achieve good pruning rate without accuracy loss. Where Wi
(1)

model, and Pi

3.5.1

is the weights in pretrained

(0)

is derived by Wi , and l is the training loss of the pretrained model.

Non-structured pruning on LeNet-5 & AlexNet

LeNet-5 on MNIST
We first evaluate the performance of our non-structured pruning method on LeNet-5 model using
MNIST dataset. The comparisons of our method and previous methods are shown in Table 3.1.
We achieve 630× pruning rate with 99.0% accuracy and 301× pruning rate with 99.2% accuracy.
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Table 3.1: Comparisons of overall weight pruning results on LeNet-5 using MNIST data set.

Method
Accuracy
Uncompressed
99.2%
Iterative Pruning [12]
99.2%
One-step ADMM [77]
99.2%
Optimal Brain Surgery [39]
98.3%
Progressive ADMM [85]
99.2%
Our method
99.2%
Our method
99.0%

Pruning rate
1×
12.5×
71.2×
111×
200×
301×
630×

Table 3.2: Comparisons of overall non-structured weight pruning results on AlexNet model for ImageNet
dataset.

Method
Top-5 accuracy
Uncompressed
80.2%/82.4%
Iterative Pruning [12]
80.3%
Optimal Brain Surgery [39]
80.0%
Hoyer-Square [67]
80.2%
One-step ADMM [77]
80.2%
Progressive ADMM [85]
82.0%
Our method (one-step)
82.0%
Our method
82.3%
Our method
82.0%

Accuracy loss
0.0%
−0.1%
0.2%
0.0%
0.0%
0.4%
0.4%
0.1%
0.4%

Pruning rate
1×
9.1×
17.7×
21.3×
21×
36×
37×
40×
45×

AlexNet on ImageNet.
Table 3.2 shows the non-structured pruning results. In order to highlight the difference of the
obtained accuracy by using different pruning methods, we use the relative accuracy loss against
the baseline accuracy of each method. Note that the pruning rates of early works are less than or
around 20×. A recent work [85] achieves 36× pruning rate with 82.0% top-5 accuracy. We use
the same baseline as [85] and achieves 45× pruning rate with 82.0% top-5 accuracy.
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Table 3.3: Structured pruning results on ResNet-18 for ImageNet dataset.

Method
Sparsity type
Original
N/A
DCP [66]
filter & shape
Channel Gating [90] filter & shape
Our method
shape
Our method
filter & shape

Pruning rate
1.0×
1.5×
1.9×
3.0×
4.2×

Top-1/Top-5
69.6%/89.0%
69.2%/89.0%
68.8%/ N/A
69.2%/89.0%
68.7%/88.5%

Table 3.4: Structured pruning results on ResNet-50 for ImageNet dataset.

Method
Sparsity type Pruning rate
Original
N/A
1.0×
Geometric Median [43] filter & shape
1.7×
DCP [66]
filter & shape
2.0×
CNN-FCF [69]
filter & shape
2.1×
AutoPrune [81]
filter & shape
2.2×
Struct-ADMM [80]
filter & shape
2.7×
Our method
filter & shape
3.2×

3.5.2

Top-1/Top-5
75.7%/92.7%
74.8%/92.3%
75.1%/92.3%
74.6%/92.2%
74.5%/ N/A
N/A /92.3%
75.0%/92.3%

Structured pruning on ResNet-18, ResNet-50 and MobileNet-V21.0

ResNet-18 on ImageNet.
Table 3.3 shows the structured pruning results. DCP [66] only achieves 1.5× pruning rate without
accuracy loss. Channel Gating [90] method achieves 1.9× pruning rate with minor accuracy loss.
In our proposed method, we achieve 3.0× pruning rate without accuracy loss. We also implement filter-wise sparsity together with shape-wise sparsity on ResNet-18, and totally achieve 4.2×
pruning rate with 0.5% accuracy loss.
Table 3.5: Structured pruning results on MobileNet-V2-1.0 for CIFAR-10 dataset

Method
Sparsity type Conv. pruning rate
Original
N/A
1.0×
DCP [66]
filter & shape
1.4×
Our method filter & shape
7.2×

Accuracy
94.5%
94.7%
94.6%
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ResNet-50 on ImageNet.
Table 3.4 shows the structured pruning results. The recent works Geometric Median [43], StructADMM [80], CNN-FCF [69] and DCP [66] achieve 1.7× to 2.2× pruning rate with minor or no
accuracy loss. In our proposed method, we achieve 3.2× pruning rate with 92.3% Top-5 accuracy.

MobileNet-V2-1.0 on CIFAR-10.
We demonstrate the results of our structured pruning method on MobileNet-V2-1.0 for CIFAR-10
dataset in Table 3.5. We achieve 7.2× pruning rate without accuracy loss, which is significantly
higher than 1.4× in DCP [66].
Overall, using the same training trails, our method can achieve higher pruning rate than the
prior works. For small to large-scale dataset, our proposed method significantly outperforms the
state-of-the-art in terms of pruning rate and accuracy, leading to light weight storage and computation.

3.6

Discussion on inference acceleration

The computations in the the convolutional layers of DNNs are usually transformed to matrix multiplications by converting the weight tensors and feature map tensors to matrices [72], which is
called general matrix multiplication (GEMM). In GEMM, filter-wise pruning corresponds to row
pruning, and shape-wise pruning corresponds to column pruning. Combining filter-wise and shapewise sparsity can directly reduce the dimension of weight matrix in GEMM by removing zero rows
and columns, which can achieve notable speedup on CPU and GPU platforms. In this paper, we
achieve higher overall pruning rate for the combination of filter-wise and shape-wise pruning compared with prior works, e.g. we achieve 3.2× structured pruning rate on the convolutional layers
of ResNet-50 for ImageNet dataset, which is 45% higher than 2.2× in [81]. The sparse model with
higher structured pruning rate can achieve higher speedup on CPU and GPU platforms.
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3.7

Summary

In this paper, we propose a unified DNN weight pruning framework with dynamically updated regularization terms bounded by the designated constraint, which can generate both non-structured
sparsity and different kinds of structured sparsity. In our proposed framework, we first use
reweighted method to regularize the model, then remove the weights which are close to zero
and mask the gradient of these weights to ensure that they no longer update, and we retrain the
remaining non-zero weights to retrieve the accuracy. Experimental results demonstrate that we
achieve higher pruning rate than state-of-the-arts for both non-structured and structured pruning
with negligible accuracy degradation.
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C HAPTER 4

G ENERATION OF L OW D ISTORTION
A DVERSARIAL ATTACKS VIA C ONVEX
P ROGRAMMING

4.1

Introduction

Deep neural networks (DNNs) continue to show extraordinary performance in a variety of tasks,
such as image recognition [3–5], speech recognition [6, 7], and natural language processing [91].
However, recent research shows that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks [23, 92]. Adversarial attacks, also known as adversarial examples, are generated by incorporating imperceptible
perturbations into the original input data in order to mislead the prediction of DNNs [93, 94].
Research on the robustness of DNNs follows two directions in general. The first is to enhance
the robustness of DNNs, in order to increase the degree of difficulty for adversarial attacks to
fool DNNs [19–22]. The second is to design adversarial attack methods to test the robustness of
DNNs [23–27]. These two aspects reciprocally benefit each other towards hardening DNNs, and
our research in this chapter belongs to the latter one.
Adversarial attacks can be either untargeted or targeted. In untargeted attacks, adversarial

44
examples are generated to fool DNNs’ prediction towards a label other than the correct one [95].
In targeted attacks, adversarial examples are designed to force the DNNs to classify the data with
a desired incorrect target label [23]. In this chapter, we focus on the problem of targeted attack
generation, as such attacks are commonly regarded as being stronger [26].
Despite the fact that the loss functions of DNNs are non-convex, most adversarial attack generation problems in the literature are solved by gradient descent; for example [34] solves the C&W
attack problem via ADAM. Recent papers on certifying the robustness of DNNs employ relaxations to formulate convex optimization problems [96, 97].
In contrast to these methods, in this chapter we first formulate the adversarial attack generation
problem as one with a convex objective function but non-convex constraints. We then design an
algorithm which iteratively solves a related convex problem. We prove that upon convergence of
our iterative algorithm, the obtained solution is feasible for the original (non-convex) problem. We
achieve 100% attack success rate on both the original undefended models and the adversariallytrained models. Our distortions of the `∞ attack are respectively 31% and 18% lower than the
C&W attack for the best case and average case on the CIFAR-10 data set.

4.2
4.2.1

Related work
Gradient descent based attack methods

L-BFGS attack [23]: The L-BFGS attack is the first attack based on optimization. It aims to
minimize the cross-entropy loss of the adversarial example and the target label, while minimizing
the `2 distortion of the adversarial example and original data.
FGM attack [24] & IFGM attack [92]: The fast gradient method (FGM) attack uses the gradient
of the loss function to find the direction in which the intensity of pixels should be changed. It
is an attack that is designed to be fast rather than to pursue low distortion in the original data.
The iterative fast gradient method (IFGM) attack is a refinement of the FGM attack which takes
multiple smaller steps instead of a single step on gradient descent.
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C&W attack [26]: Based on the basic ideas of L-BFGS attack, C&W attack design their own
objective functions instead of cross-entropy loss, which help them achieve 100% attack successful
rate. Besides on `2 attack, C&W also design iterative methods for the `0 and `∞ attack, in which
the objective functions are non-differentiable. C&W attack is state-of-the-art in the adversarial
attacks on DNNs.

4.2.2

Related work on convex programming and mixed integer linear
programming

Robustness certification of DNNs: Recently, convex optimization methods have been used to
certify the robustness of DNNs rather than to generate adversarial attacks. Examples include the
use of linear programming in [96], quadratic programming in [97], and semidefinite programming
in [98].
Binarized neural networks attack: The paper [99] presents a new method based on mixed integer
linear programming to attack binarized neural networks. The generation of low distortion attacks
on binarized neural networks is a non-convex problem, where the binary nature of the activation
functions is responsible for the lack of convexity. The authors use the property that the output of
every layer is composed of zeros and ones to translate the lack of convexity into binary constraints.
This presents a special case in which the non-convex problem can be solved by mixed integer linear
programming.

4.2.3

Representative defense method

Defensive distillation [25]: Defensive distillation uses distillation for the purpose of improving
the robustness of a neural network. In the defensive distillation method, we need to train a teacher
network model at “high temperature” at first and then employ the teacher network to produce soft
labels for the training data set. Later, the created soft labels are used to train a distilled model.
Finally, we reduce the temperature to low values when we test the accuracy of the distilled model.
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Adversarial training [100]: In adversarial training, adversarial examples with correct labels are
mixed into the training data set. The neural network is then retrained to increase its robustness.

4.3

Problem statement

Consider an N -layer DNN, where the weights and biases in the i-th layer are respectively denoted
by Wi and bi , and that all the layers in the DNN are fully connected. Assume that x0 is a vector
representation of an image in the test set, and that x is an adversarial example that we wish to
generate. The example x has the property that it is a small perturbation of x0 but is classified as
belonging to the incorrect target class t by the DNN.
The output of the first layer of the DNN to input x is

y1 = σ(W1 x + b1 ).

Here, y1 and b1 are vectors, and σ(·) is the non-linear activation function which acts elementwise
on its vector argument. This function is generally chosen to be the ReLU function [70] in state-ofthe-art DNNs, which is defined as

σ(τ ) =




τ

if τ ≥ 0,



0

if τ < 0.

In a DNN the output of one layer is the input to the next, and thus the output of the i-th layer for
i = 2, . . . , N − 1 is
yi = σ(Wi yi−1 + bi ).
The output before the softmax function (the collection of logits) is

z = WN yN −1 + bN .
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The logits are input into the softmax function to calculate the scores of different classes. The
class with the highest score will determine the classification made by the DNN. Since the softmax
function is an increasing function, the class with the highest logit will achieve the highest score
and become the classification result. For a targeted adversarial attack, the target class t should have
the highest logit, which means
(z)t = max(z),
where (z)t is the t-th element in the vector z. The above equation can be equivalently rewritten as

z ≤ (z)t 1,

where 1 is the column vector of all ones. The above inequality ensures the success of the targeted
attack. To ensure that x is an imperceptible perturbation of x0 we minimize the Lp distortion
between the adversarial example and the original data. Namely, we minimize

kx − x0 kp ,

which is a convex function of x for p ≥ 1. Also, to ensure the adversarial example yields a valid
image we impose the constraint
0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
We can now formulate the adversarial attack problem as
minimize kx − x0 kp
x, yi , z

subject to y1 = σ(W1 x + b1 )
yi = σ(Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1
z = WN yN −1 + bN
z ≤ zt 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.

(4.1)
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This optimization problem has a convex objective and convex inequality constraints. However,
σ(·) is a nonlinear function which renders the equality constraints, and therefore the optimization
problem as a whole, non-convex.

4.4

Problem relaxation and proposed algorithms

In this section, we propose an algorithm which iteratively solves a convex relaxation of (4.1) to
obtain an approximate solution. This approximate solution is feasible in the sense that it satisfies
all the constraints in (4.1).
Since σ(·) acts elementwise on its argument, we can consider the effect of σ(·) as an elementwise multiplication of the input vector with a binary vector ai whose elements are zero/one based
on the sign of the elements of the vectors W1 x + b1 and Wi yi−1 + bi ,

y1 = a1 ◦ (W1 x + b1 ),
yi = ai ◦ (Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1,

where ◦ denotes elementwise vector multiplication.
Due to the dependence of ai on the sign of Wi yi−1 + bi , the equality constraint yi = ai ◦
(Wi yi−1 + bi ) is still non-convex. We break this dependence by using an iterative procedure in
which the sign of Wi yi−1 + bi , computed from the solution of the previous iteration, is used to
form ai in the current iteration. Concretely, rather than solve the non-convex problem (4.1), we
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solve for k = 0, 1, . . . , T the convex problem
minimize kx − x0 kp + λkx − x(k) k2
x, yi , z

(k)

subject to y1 = a1 ◦ (W1 x + b1 )
(4.2)

(k)

yi = ai ◦ (Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1
z = WN yN −1 + bN
z ≤ zt 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
(k+1)

We denote by x(k+1) , yi

, z(k+1) the solution of problem (4.2) at iteration k, and let x(0) = x0 .

(k)

We set the value of a1 according to

(k)
(a1 )j

=




1


0

if (W1 x(k) + b1 )j ≥ 0,
(4.3)
if (W1 x

(k)

+ b1 )j < 0,

where (v)j denotes the jth element of the vector v and j takes all values between one and the
(k)

dimension of the vector a1 . We employ a special procedure to compute the values of ai . Rather
(k)

than use yi

from the previous iteration, we propagate forward through the layers the value x(k)
[k]

of x from the previous iteration and denote the resulting values by yi . To make this precise, we
[k]

(k)

(k)

(k)

find a1 from (4.3) and set y1 = a1 ◦ (W1 x(k) + b1 ). We then find a2 from

(k)
(a2 )j

[k]

(k)

=




1

if (W2 y1 + b2 )j ≥ 0,



0

if (W2 y1 + b2 )j < 0,

[k]

[k]

[k]

and set y2 = a2 ◦ (W2 y1 + b2 ). We continue this procedure so that for i = 2, . . . , N − 1,

(k)
(ai )j

=




1


0

[k]

if (Wi yi−1 + bi )j ≥ 0,
if

[k]
(Wi yi−1

+ bi )j < 0.

(4.4)
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We emphasize that problem (4.2) is convex and can therefore be solved efficiently using convex
optimization tools.
(k+1)

This motivates Algorithm 3: We iteratively solve (4.2), using (4.3) and (4.4) to update ai
(k+1)

until the condition ai

,

(k)

= ai , i = 1, . . . , N − 1 is satisfied. We initialize the algorithm by

setting x(0) = x0 .
Proposition 1. If for some k we have
(k+1)

ai

(k)

= ai , i = 1, . . . , N − 1,

(4.5)

then the solution x of (4.2), denoted by x(k+1) , is a feasible solution of problem (4.1).
P ROOF : See Appendix A.1.
The parameter λ characterizes the relative importance of the two terms in the objective function
of (4.2): A small value of λ de-emphasizes the second norm, which results in a solution with lower
distortion and therefore better performance; a large value of λ emphasizes the second norm, which
helps achieve convergence (at the expense of performance) when (4.2) is solved iteratively by
penalizing the difference of the optimal x between two consecutive iterations.
This motivates Algorithm 4: We choose a small value of λ and check the convergence of
Algorithm 3. If convergence, as determined by the satisfaction of condition (4.5), is not achieved
then we increase the value of λ and apply Algorithm 3 again; if convergence is achieved then we
have found a value of λ that results in a feasible solution. The advantage of this process is that
when λ is small, the optimization problem (4.2) is allowed to explore the x-space for a solution with
small distortion. Therefore, our aim is to find the smallest value of λ that results in convergence
(in our experiments such a value of λ could always be found); we refer to this value as λ̂, and refer
to the solution of Algorithm 3 with λ = λ̂ as x̂.
Remark: Once λ̂ is obtained, we may explore whether solutions with lower distortion than x̂
can be found as follows: We start from λ = λ̂ and apply Algorithm 3 with the important difference
that rather than setting x(0) = x0 we take x(0) = x̂. We then iteratively reapply Algorithm 3,
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Algorithm 3 Find approximate solution of (4.1) by iteratively solving (4.2)
Input: image x0 , weights Wi , biases bi , parameter λ
Set x(0) = x0
(0)
Calculate ai according to (4.3) and (4.4)
Set k = 0
for k ≤ T do
Solve problem (4.2) to obtain x(k+1)
(k+1)
Update ai
according to (4.3) and (4.4)
if Condition (4.5) is satisfied then
Break for loop
end if
Set k = k + 1
end for
Algorithm 4 Iterative method to guarantee convergence of Algorithm 3
Input: image x0 , weights Wi , biases bi
Set parameter λ
repeat
Apply Algorithm 3
if Condition (4.5) is not satisfied then
Increase value of λ
end if
until Condition (4.5) is satisfied
Set x̂ to solution of Algorithm 3
Set λ̂ = λ
we decrease λ if convergence is achieved and otherwise increase λ, each time setting x(0) to be
the solution of Algorithm 3 from the previous iteration. In our experiments we find that applying
this methods for several iterations usually helps us find a solution with lower distortion than just
applying Algorithms 3 and 4.

4.5

Numerical results

We compare our proposed method with the IFGM attack [92] and the C&W attack [92], in which
the C&W attack is state-of-the-art adversarial attack on DNNs. In the C&W attack, the authors
proposed their method for `0 , `2 and `∞ attacks, since `0 norm is non-convex, it is not applicable
for convex programming. Thus we compare our `2 and `∞ attacks with other two works. Our ex-
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perimental results demonstrate that the adversarial examples generated by our method have lower
distortion than the IFGM attack and the C&W attack on the MNIST [4] and CIFAR-10 [101] data
sets.

4.5.1

Experiment setup

We evaluate the performance of different attack methods on the LeNet-300-100 [4]. In this network, the number of neurons in the two hidden layers are 300 and 100, respectively. The activation
functions after the hidden layers are chosen to be ReLU. The test accuracy of LeNet-300-100 on
the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets are around 98% and 57%, respectively. In our proposed algorithm, we solve the convex problem by CVXPY [102,103], which is a tool for convex programming
in Python.

4.5.2

Attack success rate and distortion for the `2 attack

We test the `2 attack of our proposed method, the IFGM attack method and the C&W attack method
on the first 500 images in the test sets of the MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets. For every image we
implement targeted attacks on its 9 incorrect labels. In the 4500 adversarial attacks in each data
set, both of the methods achieve 100% attack success rate (ASR), and the `2 distortion of different
attack methods on CIFAR-10 are shown in Table 4.1.
In both of the data sets, the performance of our method and the C&W attack are much better
than the IFGM attack. In the MNIST data set, our results are close to the C&W attack. While
in the larger data set CIFAR-10, we achieve lower distortion than the C&W attack on both of the
three cases.

4.5.3

Attack success rate and distortion for the `∞ attack

The data sets setup for the `∞ attack test is the same as the `2 attack. The results of different `∞
attack methods are shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.1: Comparisons of different `2 attacks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets

Data Set
MNIST

CIFAR-10

Attack Method
IFGM (`2 )
C&W (`2 )
Convex Programming (`2 )
IFGM (`2 )
C&W (`2 )
Convex Programming (`2 )

Best Case
ASR
`2
100
1.14
100
1.10
100
1.09
100 0.168
100 0.158
100 0.154

Average Case
ASR
`2
100
1.93
100
1.73
100
1.73
100 0.740
100 0.648
100 0.645

Worst Case
ASR
`2
100
2.83
100
2.35
100
2.35
100 1.339
100 1.114
100 1.112

Table 4.2: Comparison of different `∞ attacks for MNIST and CIFAR-10 data sets

Data Set
MNIST

CIFAR-10

Attack Method
IFGM (`∞ )
C&W (`∞ )
Convex Programming (`∞ )
IFGM (`∞ )
C&W (`∞ )
Convex Programming (`∞ )

Best Case
ASR
`∞
100
0.081
100
0.076
100
0.074
100 0.0046
100 0.0051
100 0.0035

Average Case
ASR
`∞
100
0.134
100
0.117
100
0.114
100 0.0198
100 0.0181
100 0.0149

Worst Case
ASR
`∞
100
0.197
100
0.156
100
0.152
100 0.0379
100 0.0299
100 0.0256

On the `∞ attack, we achieve a notable improvement compared with the results of the C&W
attack. In the CIFAR-10 data set, we respectively reduce the `∞ distortion by 31% and 18% for
the best case and average case compared with the C&W attack on the `∞ attack.

4.5.4

Attack against adversarial training

We test the performance of our method under adversarial training [100] using data augmentation,
where we add 4500 adversarial examples with correct labels into the training data set. For these
adversarially-trained models, we find that the adversarial examples generated by our `∞ method
consistently have lower distortion compared with the adversarial examples generated by the C&W
method. We elaborate on these results for the `∞ case below.
In our first group of experiments, we generate adversarial examples, perform adversarial training, and attack adversarially-trained models, all using the same method (i.e., our convex programming method versus the C&W method), and then compare their distortions against each other. On
MNIST, the average distortion of our method is 0.124, which is lower than 0.129 for the C&W
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method. On CIFAR-10, the average distortion of our method is 0.0231, which is 12% lower than
0.0262 for the C&W method.
In our second group of experiments, we implement adversarial training using adversarial examples generated by IFGM method, and then attack the adversarially-trained model using our method
and the C&W method. On MNIST, the average distortion of our method is 0.126, which is lower
than 0.132 for the C&W method. On CIFAR-10, the average distortion of our method is 0.0262,
which is 11% lower than 0.0295 for the C&W method.

4.6

Summary

In this chapter, we propose an innovative method for generating adversarial examples via convex
programming. Our method achieves a 100% attack success rate on both the original undefended
models and the adversarially-trained models. We also decrease the distortion (on both original undefended models and adversarially-trained models) of adversarial examples compared with stateof-the-art attack methods.
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C HAPTER 5

A U NIFIED M IN -M AX F RAMEWORK FOR
A DVERSARIAL E XPLORATION AND
R OBUSTNESS

5.1

Introduction

Training a machine learning model that is capable of assuring its worst-case performance against
all possible adversaries given a specified threat model is a fundamental yet challenging problem,
especially for deep neural networks (DNNs) [23, 24, 26]. A common practice to train an adversarially robust model is based on a specific form of min-max training, known as adversarial training
(AT) [24, 104], where the minimization step learns model weights under the adversarial loss constructed at the maximization step in an alternative training fashion. In practice, AT has achieved
the state-of-the-art defense performance against `p -norm-ball input perturbations [105].
Although the min-max principle is widely used in AT and its variants [31, 104, 106, 107], few
works have studied its power in attack generation. Thus, we ask: Beyond AT, can other types of
min-max formulation and optimization techniques advance the research in both adversarial attack
and robustness exploration? In this chapter, we give an affirmative answer corroborated by the
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substantial performance gain and the ability of self-learned risk interpretation using our proposed
min-max framework on several tasks for adversarial attack and defense.
We demonstrate the utility of a general formulation for minimizing the maximal loss induced
from a set of risk sources (domains). Our considered min-max formulation is fundamentally different from AT, as our maximization step is taken over the probability simplex of the set of domains.
Moreover, we show that many problem setups in adversarial attacks and defenses can in fact be reformulated under this general min-max framework, including attacking model ensembles [28, 29],
devising universal perturbation to input samples [30] and generalized AT over multiple types of
threat models [31, 32]. However, current methods for solving these tasks often rely on simple
heuristics (e.g., uniform averaging), resulting in significant performance drops when compared to
our proposed min-max optimization framework.
Contributions (i) We indicate the utility of min-max optimization beyond AT by proposing a
general and theoretically grounded framework on adversarial attack and defense. As a byproduct
and an exclusive feature, by tracking the learnable weighting factors associated with multiple domains, our method can provide tools for self-adjusted importance assessment on the mixed learning
tasks.
(ii) With the aid of min-max optimization, we propose a unified alternating one-step projected
gradient descent (APGD) attack method, which can readily be specified to generate model ensemble attack, and universal attack over multiple images. In theory, we show that APGD has
an O(1/T ) convergence rate, where T is the number of iterations. In practice, we show that
APGD obtains 17.48%, 35.21% and 9.39% improvement on average compared with PGD attack
on CIFAR-10.
(iii) We propose a generalized AT scheme under mixed types of adversarial attacks and demonstrate that the diversified attack ensemble helps adversarial robustness. Compared with vanilla AT,
our new training scheme leads to better worst-case robustness even if the defender lacks prior
knowledge of the strengths of attacks.
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5.2

Related work

Recent studies have identified that DNNs are highly vulnerable to adversarial manipulations in
various applications [23,94,108–115], thus leading to an arms race between adversarial attacks [26,
27, 95, 105, 116–118] and defenses [25, 31, 104, 106, 107, 119–121]. One intriguing property of
adversarial examples is the transferability across multiple domains [122–125], which indicates a
more challenging yet promising research direction – devising universal adversarial perturbations
over model ensembles [28, 29], and input samples [30, 126, 127]. However, current approaches
suffer from a significant performance loss for resting on the uniform averaging strategy or heuristic
weighting schemes [29, 127]. As a natural extension following min-max attack, we study the
generalized AT under multiple perturbations [31, 32, 128, 129]. Finally, our min-max framework
is adapted and inspired by previous literature on robust learning over multiple domains [130–133].

5.3

Preliminaries

Consider K loss functions {Fi (v)} (each of which is defined on a learning domain), the problem
of robust learning over K domains can be formulated as [130–132]

minimize maximize
v∈V

w∈P

PK

i=1

wi Fi (v),

(5.1)

where v and w are optimization variables, V is a constraint set, and P denotes the probability
simplex P = {w | 1T w = 1, wi ∈ [0, 1], ∀i}. Since the inner maximization problem in (5.1) is a
linear function of w over the probabilistic simplex, problem (5.1) is thus equivalent to

minimize maximize Fi (v),
v∈V

i∈[K]

where [K] denotes the integer set {1, 2, . . . , K}.

(5.2)
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Benefit and challenge from (5.1).

Compared to multi-task learning in a finite-sum formula-

tion which minimizes K losses on average, problem (5.1) provides consistently robust worst-case
performance across all domains. This can be explained from the epigraph form of (5.2),

minimize t,
v∈V,t

subject to Fi (v) ≤ t, i ∈ [K],

(5.3)

where t is an epigraph variable [134] that provides the t-level robustness at each domain.
In computation, the inner maximization problem of (5.1) always returns the one-hot value of
w, namely, w = ei , where ei is the ith standard basis vector, and i = arg maxi {Fi (v)}. However,
this one-hot coding reduces the generalizability to other domains and induces instability of the
learning procedure in practice. Such an issue is often mitigated by introducing a strongly concave
regularizer in the inner maximization step to strike a balance between the average and the worstcase performance [130, 132].
Regularized formulation. Following [130], we penalize the distance between the worst-case
loss and the average loss over K domains. This yields

minimize maximize
v∈V

w∈P

PK

i=1

wi Fi (v) − γ2 kw − 1/Kk22 ,

(5.4)

where γ > 0 is a regularization parameter. As γ → 0, problem (5.4) is equivalent to (5.1). By
contrast, it becomes the finite-sum problem when γ → ∞ since w → 1/K. In this sense, the
trainable w provides an essential indicator on the importance level of each domain. The larger the
weight is, the more important the domain is. We call w domain weights in this chapter.

5.4

Min-max power in attack design

To the best of our knowledge, few works have studied the power of min-max in attack generation.
In this section, we demonstrate how the unified min-max framework (5.4) fits into various attack
settings. With the help of domain weights, our solution yields better empirical performance and
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explainability. Finally, we present the min-max algorithm with convergence analysis to craft robust
perturbations against multiple domains.

5.4.1

A unified framework for robust adversarial attacks

The general goal of adversarial attack is to craft an adversarial example x0 = x0 + δ ∈ Rd to
mislead the prediction of machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) systems, where x0 denotes
the natural example with the true label t0 , and δ is known as adversarial perturbation, commonly
subject to `p -norm (p ∈ {0, 1, 2, ∞}) constraint X := {δ | kδkp ≤ , x0 + δ ∈ [0, 1]d } for a given
small number . Here the `p norm enforces the similarity between x0 and x0 , and the input space
of ML/DL systems is normalized to [0, 1]d .
Ensemble attack over multiple models. Consider K ML/DL models {Mi }K
i=1 , the goal is
to find robust adversarial examples that can fool all K models simultaneously. In this case, the
notion of ‘domain’ in (5.4) is specified as ‘model’, and the objective function Fi in (5.4) signifies
the attack loss f (δ; x0 , y0 , Mi ) given the natural input (x0 , y0 ) and the model Mi . Thus, problem
(5.4) becomes

minimize maximize
δ∈X

K
X

w∈P

i=1

γ
wi f (δ; x0 , y0 , Mi ) − kw − 1/Kk22 ,
2

(5.5)

where w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each model.
Universal perturbation over multiple examples. Consider K natural examples
{(xi , yi )}K
i=1 and a single model M, our goal is to find the universal perturbation δ so that
all the corrupted K examples can fool M. In this case, the notion of ‘domain’ in (5.4) is specified
as ‘example’, and problem (5.4) becomes

minimize maximize
δ∈X

w∈P

K
X
i=1

γ
wi f (δ; xi , yi , M) − kw − 1/Kk22 ,
2

(5.6)
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Algorithm 5 APGD to solve the min-max problem
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

Input: given w(0) and δ (0) .
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
outer min.: fixing w = w(t−1) , call PGD (5.7) to update δ (t)
inner max.: fixing δ = δ (t) , update w(t) with projected gradient ascent (5.11)
end for

where different from (5.5), w encodes the difficulty level of attacking each example.
Benefits of min-max attack generation with learnable domain weights w.

We can in-

terpret (5.5)-(5.6) as finding the robust adversarial attack against the worst-case environment that
an adversary encounters, e.g., multiple victim models, data samples, and input transformations.
The proposed min-max design of adversarial attacks leads to two main benefits. First, compared
to the heuristic weighting strategy (e.g., clipping thresholds on the importance of individual attack
losses [127]), our proposal is free of supervised manual adjustment on domain weights. Even by
carefully tuning the heuristic weighting strategy, we find that our approach with self-adjusted w
consistently outperforms the clipping strategy in [127]. Second, the learned domain weights can
be used to assess the model robustness when facing different types of adversary.

5.4.2

Min-max algorithm for adversarial attack generation

We propose the alternating one-step projected gradient descent (APGD) method (Algorithm 5) to
solve problem (5.4). For ease of presentation, we write problems (5.5), (5.6) into the general form

minimize maximize
δ∈X

w∈P

PK

i=1

wi Fi (δ) − γ2 kw − 1/Kk22 ,

where Fi denotes the ith individual attack loss. We show that at each iteration, APGD takes only
one-step PGD for outer minimization and one-step projected gradient ascent for inner maximization.
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Outer minimization

Considering w = w(t−1) and F (δ) :=

PK

i=1

(t−1)

wi

Fi (δ) in (5.4), we

perform one-step PGD to update δ at iteration t,


δ (t) = projX δ (t−1) − α∇δ F (δ (t−1) ) ,

(5.7)

where proj(·) denotes the Euclidean projection operator, i.e., projX (a) = arg minx∈X kx − ak22
at the point a, α > 0 is a given learning rate, and ∇δ denotes the first-order gradient w.r.t. δ. If
p = ∞, then the projection function becomes the clip function. In Proposition 2, we derive the
solution of projX (a) under different `p norms for p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
Proposition 2. Given a point a ∈ Rd and a constraint set X = {δ|kδkp ≤ , č ≤ δ ≤ ĉ}, the
Euclidean projection δ ∗ = projX (a) has the closed-form solution when p ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
1) If p = 1, then δ ∗ is given by

Pd

 P[č ,ĉ ] (ai )
i i
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )| ≤ 
δi∗ =

 P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0}) otherwise,

(5.8)

where xi denotes the ith element of a vector x; P[či ,ĉi ] (·) denotes the clip function over the interval [či , ĉi ]; sign(x) = 1 if x ≥ 0, otherwise 0; λ1 ∈ (0, maxi |ai | − /d] is the root of
Pd
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0})| = .
2) If p = 2, then δ ∗ is given by

Pd

2
2
 P[č ,ĉ ] (ai )
i
i
i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )) ≤ 
∗
δi =

 P[či ,ĉi ] (ai /(λ2 + 1)) otherwise,
where λ2 ∈ (0, kak2 / − 1] is the root of

Pd

i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] (ai /(λ2

+ 1)))2 = 2 .

(5.9)
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3) If p = 0 and  ∈ N+ , then δ ∗ is given by


 δ 0 ηi ≥ [η]
i
∗
δi =

 0 otherwise,


p


2ai či − č2i ai < či


 p
ηi =
2ai ĉi − ĉ2i ai > ĉi




 |ai |
otherwise.

(5.10)

where [η] denotes the -th largest element of η, and δi0 = P[či ,ĉi ] (ai ).
P ROOF : See Appendix A.

Inner maximization By fixing δ = δ (t) and letting ψ(w) :=

PK

i=1

wi Fi (δ (t) ) − γ2 kw − 1/Kk22

in problem (5.4), we then perform one-step PGD (w.r.t. −ψ) to update w,


w(t) = projP w(t−1) + β∇w ψ(w(t−1) )
|
{z
}
b

= (b − µ1)+ ,

(5.11)

where β > 0 is a given learning rate, ∇w ψ(w) = φ(t) − γ(w − 1/K), and φ(t) :=
[F1 (δ (t) ), . . . , FK (δ (t) )]T . In (5.11), the second equality holds due to the closed-form of projection operation onto the probabilistic simplex P [135], where (x)+ = max{0, x}, and µ is the
root of the equation 1T (b − µ1)+ = 1. Since 1T (b − mini {bi }1 + 1/K)+ ≥ 1T 1/K = 1,
and 1T (b − maxi {bi }1 + 1/K)+ ≤ 1T 1/K = 1, the root µ exists within the interval
[mini {bi } − 1/K, maxi {bi } − 1/K] and can be found via the bisection method [134].
Convergence analysis We remark that APGD follows the gradient primal-dual optimization
framework [133], and thus enjoys the same optimization guarantees.
Theorem 1. Suppose that in problem (5.4) Fi (δ) has L-Lipschitz continuous gradients, and X is
and β < γ1 , then the sequence {δ (t) , w(t) }Tt=1

generated by Algorithm 5 converges to a first-order stationary point1 in rate O T1 .
a convex compact set. Given learning rates α ≤

1

1
L

The stationarity is measured by the `2 norm of gradient of the objective in (5.4) w.r.t. (δ, w).
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P ROOF : See Appendix B.

5.5

Min-max power in defense

In this section, we show that the min-max principle can be used to generalize AT from a defender’s
perspective. Different from promoting robustness of adversarial examples against the worst-case
attacking environment (Sec. 5.4), the generalized AT promotes model’s robustness against the
worst-case defending environment, given by the existence of diversified `p attacks.
One key challenge in generalized AT is that the multiple `p perturbations overlap largely thus
weakening the diversity of inner threat models. To enhance the worst-case defending environment,
we propose quantifying and regularizing the diversity of `p attacks (Sec. 5.5.2) to gain complementary robustness from defense against diversified attacks.

5.5.1

A unified framework for adversarial training under mixed types
of adversarial attacks

Conventional AT is restricted to a single type of norm-ball constrained adversarial attack [104].
For example, AT under `∞ attack yields

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize ftr (θ, δ; x, y),
θ

kδk∞ ≤

(5.12)

where θ ∈ Rn denotes model parameters, δ denotes -tolerant `∞ attack, and ftr (θ, δ; x, y) is the
training loss under perturbed examples {(x + δ, y)}. However, there possibly exist blind attacking
spots across multiple types of adversarial attacks so that AT under one attack would not be strong
enough against another attack [32]. Thus, an interesting question is how to generalize AT under
multiple types of adversarial attacks. One possible way is to use the finite-sum formulation in
P
the inner maximization problem of (5.12), namely, maximize{δi ∈Xi } K1 K
i=1 ftr (θ, δi ; x, y), where
δi ∈ Xi is the ith type of adversarial perturbation defined on Xi , e.g., different `p attacks.
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However, one can also map ‘attack type’ to ‘domain’ considered in (5.1). We then generalize
AT against the strongest adversarial attack across K attack types in order to avoid blind attacking
spots:

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize maximize ftr (θ, δi ; x, y).
θ

i∈[K]

δi ∈Xi

(5.13)

In Lemma 1, we show that problem (5.13) can be equivalently transformed into the min-max form.
Lemma 1. Problem (5.13) is equivalent to

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize
θ

w∈P,{δi ∈Xi }

K
X

wi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y),

(5.14)

i=1

where w ∈ RK represent domain weights, and P has been defined in (5.1).
P ROOF : See Appendix C.
Similar to (5.4), a strongly concave regularizer −γ/2kw − 1/Kk22 can be added into the inner
maximization problem of (5.14) for boosting the stability of the learning procedure and striking a
balance between the max and the average attack performance. We finally remark that there was
an independent work [31] which also generalized AT under multiple perturbations. However, our
proposal is conceptually different from [31] as we generalize AT from the perspective of min-max
optimization.

5.5.2

Improved robustness via diversified `p attacks

It was recently shown in [136, 137] that the diversity of multiple neural networks improves adversarial robustness of an ensemble model. Different from the previous work to promote model
diversity, we measure the diversity between adversarial attacks under a single ML model. Such an
attack diversity can be quantified through the similarity between perturbation directions, namely,
input gradients {∇δi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y)}i in (5.14). Since different `p perturbations overlap largely, we
examine whether or not the promotion of diversity among `p attacks is beneficial to adversarial
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robustness. We enhance the diversity through

h(θ, {δi }; x, y) := log det(GT G),

(5.15)

where G ∈ Rd×K is a d × K matrix, each column of which corresponds to a normalized input
gradient ∇δi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y) for i ∈ [K], and h(θ, {δi }; x, y) reaches the maximum value 0 as input
gradients become orthogonal. Note that a diversity regularizer was used for defense in [137], but
for promoting the diversity of ensemble models rather than perturbation directions under a single
model. With the aid of (5.15) and a strongly concave regularizer, we modify problem (5.14) to

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize ψ(θ, w, {δi })
θ

ψ(θ, w, {δi }) :=

w∈P,{δi ∈Xi }
K
X
i=1

γ
wi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y) − kw − 1/Kk22
2

+ λh(θ, {δi }; x, y)

(5.16)

The rationale behind (5.16) is that the inner maximization enforces the worst-case defending environment: The adversary aims to enhance the effectiveness of attacks from diversified perturbation
directions. However, during outer minimization, the defender enhances the capability of the model
θ to defend those diversified attacks.

5.5.3

Min-max algorithm for generalized adversarial training

We next propose the alternating multi-step projected gradient descent (AMPGD) method to solve
the problem (5.16). We summarize AMPGD in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6 AMPGD to solve problem (5.16)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

Input: given θ (0) , w(0) , δ (0) and K > 0.
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
given w(t−1) and δ (t−1) , perform SGD to update θ (t)
given θ (t) , perform R-step PGD to update w(t) and δ (t)
end for

Problem (5.16) is in a more general non-convex non-concave min-max setting, where the inner
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maximization involves both domain weights w and adversarial perturbations {δi }. It was shown
in [138] that the multi-step PGD is required for inner maximization in order to approximate the
near-optimal solution. This is also in the similar spirit of AT [104], which executed multi-step
PGD attack during inner maximization. At step 4 of Algorithm 6, each PGD step to update w and
δ can be decomposed as


(t)
(t)
(t)
wr(t) = projP wr−1 + β∇w ψ(θ (t) , wr−1 , {δi,r−1 }) , ∀r ∈ [R],


(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
δi,r = projXi δi,r−1 + β∇δ ψ(θ (t) , wr−1 , {δi,r−1 }) , ∀r, i ∈ [R], [K]
(t)
(t)
(t−1)
. Here the superscript t represents the iteration index
where let w1 := w(t−1) and δi,1 := δi

of AMPGD, and the subscript r denotes the iteration index of R-step PGD. Clearly, the above
projection operations can be derived for closed-form expressions through (5.11) and Lemma 2. To
the best of our knowledge, it is still an open question to build theoretical convergence guarantees
for solving the general non-convex non-concave min-max problem like (5.16), except the work
[138] which proposed O(1/T ) convergence rate if the objective function satisfies a strict PolyakŁojasiewicz condition [139].

5.6

Numerical results

In this section, we first evaluate the proposed min-max optimization strategy on three attack tasks.
We show that our approach leads to substantial improvement compared with state-of-the-art attack
methods such as ensemble PGD [29] and expectation over transformation (EOT) [105, 140, 141].
We next demonstrate the effectiveness of the generalized AT for multiple types of adversarial perturbations. We show that the use of trainable domain weights in problem (5.16) can automatically
adjust the risk level of different attacks during the training process even if the defender lacks prior
knowledge on the strength of these attacks. We also show that the promotion of diversity of `p
attacks help improve adversarial robustness further.
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Fig. 5.1: Ensemble attack against four DNN models on MNIST. (a) & (b): Attack success rate of adversarial
examples generated by average (ensemble PGD) or min-max (APGD) attack method. (c): Boxplot of weight
w in APGD adversarial loss. Here we adopt the same `∞ -attack as Table 5.1.

In what follows, we show the great strength of min-max optimization also lies at the side of
attack generation. Note that problem formulations (5.5)-(5.6) are applicable to both untargeted
and targeted attack. Here we focus on the former setting and use C&W loss function [26, 104].
Ensemble attack over multiple models

We craft adversarial examples against an ensemble

of known classifiers. Recent work [29] proposed an ensemble PGD attack, which assumed equal
importance among different models, namely, wi = 1/K in problem (5.5). Throughout this task,
we measure the attack performance via ASRall - the attack success rate (ASR) of fooling model
ensembles simultaneously. Compared to the ensemble PGD attack, our approach results in 40.79%
ASRall improvement averaged over different `p -norm constraints on MNIST, respectively. In what
follows, we provide more detailed experiment results and analysis.
In Table 5.1, we show that our min-max APGD significantly outperforms ensemble PGD in
ASRall . Taking `∞ -attack on MNIST as an example, our min-max attack leads to a 90.16% ASRall ,
which largely outperforms 48.17% (ensemble PGD). The reason is that Model C, D are more
difficult to attack, which can be observed from their higher test accuracy on adversarial examples.
As a result, although the adversarial examples crafted by assigning equal weights over multiple
models are able to attack {A, B} well, they achieve a much lower ASR in {C, D}. By contrast,
APGD automatically handles the worst case {C, D} by slightly sacrificing the performance on {A,
B}: 31.47% averaged ASR improvement on {C, D} versus 0.86% degradation on {A, B}.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of average and min-max (APGD) ensemble attack over four models on MNIST. Acc
(%) represents the test accuracy of classifiers on adversarial examples.

Box constraint

Opt.

AccA

AccB

AccC

AccD

ASRall

Lift (↑)

`0 ( = 30)

avg.
min max

7.03
3.65

1.51
2.36

11.27
4.99

2.48
3.11

84.03
91.97

9.45%

`1 ( = 20)

avg.
min max

20.79
6.12

0.15
2.53

21.48
8.43

6.70
5.11

69.31
89.16

28.64%

`2 ( = 3.0)

avg.
clip [127]
min max

6.88
0.66
1.51

0.03
0.03
0.89

26.28
23.43
3.50

14.50
13.23
2.06

69.12
71.54
95.31

48.52%
37.89%

`∞ ( = 0.2)

avg.
clip [127]
min max

1.05
0.66
2.47

0.07
0.03
0.37

41.10
23.43
7.39

35.03
13.23
5.81

48.17
71.54
90.16

48.52%
87.17%

Effectiveness of learnable domain weights

Figure 5.1 depicts the ASR of four models un-

der average/min-max attacks as well as the distribution of domain weights during attack generation.
For ensemble PGD (Figure 5.1a), Model C and D are attacked insufficiently, leading to relatively
low ASR and thus weak ensemble performance. By contrast, APGD (Figure 5.1b) will encode the
difficulty level to attack different models based on the current attack loss. It dynamically adjusts
the weight wi as shown in Figure 5.1c. For instance, the weight for Model D is first raised to 0.45
because D is difficult to attack initially. Then it decreases to 0.3 once Model D encounters the sufficient attack power and the corresponding attack performance is no longer improved. It is worth
noticing that APGD is highly efficient because wi converges after a small number of iterations.
Figure 5.1c also shows wc > wd > wa > wb – indicating a decrease in model robustness for C, D,
A and B, which is exactly verified by AccC > AccD > AccA > AccB in the last row of Table 5.1
(`∞ -norm). As the perturbation radius  varies, we also observe that the ASR of min-max strategy
is consistently better or on part with the average strategy.
Comparison with stronger heuristic baselines Apart from average strategy, we compare
min-max framework with a stronger heuristic weighting scheme - loss clipping [127] in Table 5.1.
Briefly, we achieve substantial improvement over baselines consistently. Also, we show that even
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Table 5.2: Comparison of average and minmax optimization on universal perturbation over multiple input
examples. The adversarial examples are generated by 20-step `∞ -APGD.
K=2

Setting
Dataset

CIFAR-10

Model

Opt.

K=4

K=5

K = 10

ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑) ASRavg ASRgp Lift (↑)

All-CNNs

avg.
91.09 83.08
85.66 54.72
82.76 40.20
71.22 4.50
min max 92.22 85.98 3.49% 87.63 65.80 20.25% 85.02 55.74 38.66% 65.64 11.80 162.2%

LeNetV2

avg.
93.26 86.90
90.04 66.12
min max 93.34 87.08 0.21% 91.91 71.64 8.35%

VGG16

avg.
90.76 82.56
89.36 63.92
88.74 55.20
85.86 22.40
min max 92.40 85.92 4.07% 90.04 70.40 10.14% 88.97 63.30 14.67% 79.07 30.80 37.50%

GoogLeNet

88.28 55.00
72.02 8.90
91.21 63.55 15.55% 82.85 25.10 182.0%

avg.
85.02 72.48
75.20 32.68
71.82 19.60
59.01
min max 87.08 77.82 7.37% 77.05 46.20 41.37% 71.20 33.70 71.94% 45.46

0.40
2.40 600.0%

adopting converged min-max weights statically leads to a huge performance drop on attacking
model ensembles, which again verifies the power of dynamically optimizing domain weights during attack generation process.
Multi-image universal perturbation We evaluate APGD in universal perturbation on
MNIST and CIFAR-10, where 10,000 test images are randomly divided into equal-size groups
(K images per group) for universal perturbation. We measure two types of ASR (%), ASRavg
and ASRgp . Here the former represents the ASR averaged over all images in all groups, and the
latter signifies the ASR averaged over all groups but a successful attack is counted under a more
restricted condition: images within each group must be successfully attacked simultaneously by
universal perturbation. When K = 5, our approach achieves 35.21% improvement over the averaging strategy under CIFAR-10.
In Table 5.2, we compare the proposed min-max strategy (APGD) with the averaging strategy
on the attack performance of generated universal perturbations. As we can see, our method always achieves higher ASRgp for different values of K. The universal perturbation generated from
APGD can successfully attack ‘hard’ images (on which the average-based PGD attack fails) by
self-adjusting domain weights, and thus leads to a higher ASRgp . Besides, the min-max universal
perturbation also offers interpretability of “image robustness” by associating domain weights with
image visualization.
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Fig. 5.2: Generalized AT of MLP models on MNIST. (a): Violin plot of weight w in APGD versus
perturbation magnitude  of `2 -attack in AT; (b): Model robustness under different AT schemes; (c): Model
robustness and diversity regularization in (5.15) vs. adversarial training epoch.

5.6.2

Robust training under multiple types of `p attacks

Table 5.3: Adversarial training on single attacks (`∞ and `2 ) and multiple attacks (avg. and min max). The
perturbation magnitude  for `∞ and `2 attacks are 0.2 and 2.0, respectively. (a) & (b) on MNIST; (c) & (d)
on CIFAR-10.
(a) MLP

(b) LeNet

avg
Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmax
adv Accadv

Opt.

avg
Acc-`∞ Acc-`2 Accmax
adv Accadv

natural

2.70

13.86

0.85

8.28

17.93

39.32

17.57

28.63

`∞
`2

77.70
70.03

69.17
81.74

66.34
69.14

73.43
75.88

93.80
85.84

78.97
87.31

78.80
84.06

86.39
86.58

avg.

75.09

79.00

72.23

77.05

88.96

85.59

84.29

87.28

min max
+ DPAR

75.96
76.92

79.15
79.74

73.43
74.29

77.55
78.35

89.21
90.19

85.98
86.47

84.82
85.47

87.60
88.33

(c) ResNet34

(d) ResNet50

avg. + DPAR min max + DPAR avg. + DPAR min max + DPAR
Accmax
adv 32.63

33.97

34.71

35.22

35.98

36.71

37.53

38.60

Compared to vanilla AT, we show the generalized AT scheme produces models robust to multiple types of perturbation, thus leads to stronger “overall robustness”. We measure the training
avg
max
performance using two types of Acc (%): Accmax
adv and Accadv , where Accadv denotes the test ac-

curacy over examples with the strongest perturbation (`∞ or `2 ), and Accavg
adv denotes the averaged
test accuracy over examples with all types of perturbations (`∞ and `2 ). Moreover, we measure the
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overall worst-case robustness S in terms of the area under the curve ‘Accmax
adv vs. ’ (Figure 5.2b).
In Table 5.3, we present the test accuracy in different training schemes: a) natural training,
b) single-norm: vanilla AT (`∞ or `2 ), c) multi-norm: generalized AT (avg and min max), and
d) generalized AT with diversity-promoting attack regularization (DPAR, λ = 0.1 in problem
(5.15)). If the adversary only performs single-type attack, training and testing on the same attack
type leads to the best performance (diagonal of `∞ -`2 block). However, when facing `∞ and `2
avg
attacks simultaneously, multi-norm generalized AT achieves better Accmax
adv and Accadv than single-

norm AT. In particular, the min-max strategy outperforms the averaging strategy under multiple
perturbation norms. DPAR further boosts the adversarial test accuracy, which implies that the
promotion of diversified `p attacks is a beneficial supplement to adversarial training. We also
observed for ResNets on CIFAR-10, our approach results in larger benefits (2 ∼ 3% improvement
on Accmax
adv ).
Effectiveness of domain weights and diversity promotion regularizer In Figure 5.2, we
offer deeper insights on the performance of generalized AT. During the training procedure we fix
√
`∞ ( for `∞ attack during training) as 0.2, and change `2 from 0.2 to 5.6 (`∞ × d) so that
the `∞ and `2 balls are not completely overlapped [32]. In Figure 5.2a, as `2 increases, `2 -attack
becomes stronger so the corresponding w also increases, which is consistent with min-max spirit
– defending the strongest attack. We remark that min max or avg training does not always lead to
avg
the best performance on Accmax
adv and Accadv , especially when the strengths of two attacks diverge

greatly (see Figure 5.2a, 5.2b). However, Figure 5.2b shows that AMPGD is able to achieve a rather
robust model no matter how  changes (red lines), which empirically verifies the effectiveness of
our proposed training scheme. In terms of area-under-the-curve S , AMPGD achieves the highest
worst-case robustness: 6.27% and 17.64% improvement compared to the vanilla AT with `∞ and
`2 attacks. Lastly, we study the effectiveness of the proposed DPAR regularizer. Figure 5.2c
shows how the diversity (gradient orthogonality) of multi-norm attacks alters with the increase of
model robustness during the training procedure. Note that the larger the regularization term is, the
more diverse the multiple `p attacks are. Consequently, DPAR boosts the model robustness via

72
promoting attack diversity (enforcing more diverse gradient directions).

5.7

Summary

In this chapter, we propose a general min-max framework applicable to both adversarial attack
and defense settings. We show that many problem setups can be re-formulated under this general
framework. Extensive experiments show that proposed algorithms lead to significant improvement
on multiple attack and defense tasks compared with previous state-of-the-art approaches. Our minmax scheme also generalizes adversarial training (AT) for multiple types of adversarial attacks,
attaining faster convergence and better robustness compared to the vanilla AT and the average
strategy. Lastly, we propose to promote the ensemble diversity of input gradients (corresponding
to different `p attacks) to further improve the defensive performance of the generalized AT.
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C HAPTER 6

O N THE O PTIMAL I NTERDICTION OF
T RANSPORTATION N ETWORKS

6.1

Introduction

Transportation networks, also known as flow networks, are networks in which mass enters through
source nodes and on-ramps, is routed through nodes/cells and directed links, and is removed at
sink nodes and off-ramps. The flow of mass is subject to (i) conservation of mass constraints, and
(ii) link capacity constraints. Traffic networks, water supply networks, and (routing of data packets
in) computer networks are all examples of transportation networks.
The cell transmission model of mass transfer developed by Daganzo [142, 143] captures complex traffic behavior and transient phenomena, such as congestion effects and the propagation of
shocks. Ziliaskopoulos [144] used the cell transmission model to formulate the optimum traffic
assignment problem as a linear program. In an influential sequence of recent papers [145–148],
Como et al. and Savla et al. analyzed the robustness and resilience of transportation networks
under decentralized routing. In particular, they proposed routing policies that depend only on
local information and maximally delay congestion effects under adversarial perturbations to the
capacities of cells.
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In this chapter, we study the interdiction or attack on transportation networks, which for the
sake of concreteness we consider to be highway traffic networks. In this context it is of interest
to find a small set of cells whose failure at time zero, amplified and propagated by the system’s
dynamics, maximally disrupts the flow of traffic. This problem is combinatorial in nature and
intractable in general. Our work follows [1] in formulating the optimal interdiction problem as a
min-max optimization problem and subsequently employing duality to transform it to a standard
bilinear optimization problem.
We demonstrate that even without an explicit promotion of sparsity in the formulation, the
solution to the optimal interdiction problem is both sparse and binary. The solution is sparse in the
sense that the attacker’s best use of resources is to find the small set of most consequential cells in
the network, and it is binary in the sense that the attacker’s best choice is to fail these cells fully
(as opposed to partially).
Furthermore, motivated by the block coordinate gradient descent (BCGD) and block coordinate
descent (BCD) algorithms [149], we solve the bilinear problem by iteratively updating one set of
variables through a gradient-based step and then finding the globally optimal solution in the other
set of variables. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach performs better in
comparison with methods reported in earlier work [1], and we find the globally optimal solution
in the small networks that we tested and for which the global optimum could be verified through
exhaustive search.

6.2

Dynamic model of transportation networks & informal
statement of optimal interdiction problem

In this section we first introduce the cell transmission model. We augment the model in a way that
allows for the irreversible failure of cells through two mechanisms: being attacked by an adversary
and reaching the jam threshold through the accumulation of mass. We then discuss a meaningful
formulation of the optimal interdiction problem subject to attacker resource constraints.
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The network is characterized by a directed graph, where we think of nodes as cells and of
edges as allowing for flows between neighboring cells. (In this work we use the words cell and
node interchangeably.) The temporal dynamics for the cell transmission model are governed in
part by [144, 150]

xi (t) = xi (t−1) + yi (t−1) − zi (t−1)

(6.1a)

(conservation of mass on cell i)

yi (t) = vi (t) +

P

j fji (t)

(6.1b)

(total inflow to cell i = on-ramp flow + rerouted flow)

zi (t) = wi (t) +

P

j fij (t)

(6.1c)

(total outflow from cell i = off-ramp flow + rerouted flow)

for every i and t, where xi , yi , and zi , respectively denote the mass (i.e., number of vehicles) on,
the inflow to, and the outflow from, cell i; vi , wi respectively denote the mass entering the network
from on–ramp, and leaving the network from off–ramp, corresponding to cell i; fij denotes the
mass routed from cell i to adjacent cell j. The dynamics are additionally constrained to [144, 150]

xi (t) ≥ 0, vi (t) ≥ 0, wi (t) ≥ 0, fij (t) ≥ 0

(6.2a)

(positivity of mass)

yi (t) ≤ κi , zi (t) ≤ κi

(6.2b)

(inflow, outflow cannot exceed flow-capacity of cell)

yi (t) ≤ φi − xi (t), zi (t) ≤ xi (t)
(inflow cannot exceed remaining mass-capacity of cell,
outflow cannot exceed mass on cell)

(6.2c)
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with the further restrictions that fij (·) = 0 if cells i and j are not adjacent, wi (·) = 0 if cell i does
not have an off–ramp, and vi (·) specified a priori. The parameter φi denotes the amount of mass
that results in cell i being jammed. Inequalities (6.2b)–(6.2c) result from piecewise linear “supply”
and “demand” functions [150].
We assume that all mass enters the network from on-ramps and possibly a source cell and that
it leaves the network through a sink cell. The source and sink cells have very large capacities.
Without loss of generality, we take the cell with the lowest index to be the source (when a source
cell is present) and the cell with the largest index to be the sink.
As in [1], we further augment the dynamics (6.1)–(6.2) with

κi ∈ {0, ψi },
zi (t) ≤ φi − xi (t),

(6.3)

ψi denotes maximum mass can flow in or out of cell i during one time step, and φi is the same jam
mass as before. The constraints in (6.3), together with (6.2), capture two methods by which a cell
irreversibly fails:
• at time 0 an attacker reduces the capacity of cell i to zero, κi = 0;

• at time t0 ≥ 1 and as a result of the network’s dynamics the accumulated mass on cell i
reaches the jam threshold, xi (t0 ) = φi .

In both scenarios, once a cell has failed no mass can either enter or leave it thereafter.
We assume that the attacker operates under a limited budget e and that the ith entry of the
vector c characterizes the cost for the attacker of reducing κi from ψi to 0. This means that
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The attacker is subject to the constraint

cT (1 − κ/ψ) ≤ e,

lT x(t) equals total mass at t on all cells except sink cell c denotes cost for the attacker of reducing
κi from ψi to 0. where 1 is the column vector of all ones and division by a vector is element-wise.
The above inequality is equivalent to
qT κ ≥ d
with q := c/ψ and d := 1T c − e.
Define l = [1, . . . , 1, 0]T , problem in this work can be (informally) stated as follows x(t) as
the vector whose ith entry is xi (t), with similar definitions for vectors y(t), z(t), f (t), v(t), w(t), κ,
and taking l = [1, . . . , 1, 0]T so that lT x(t) equals the total mass at time t on all cells except the
sink cell, our main problem in this work can be (informally) stated as follows.
Optimal Interdiction Problem: Given the temporal evolution model (6.1)–(6.3) and a budget on
the total amount of failures, for the time horizon 0, 1, . . . , t find a sparse set of cells whose failure
P
at time 0 maximizes the total travel time tt=0 lT x(t).
We formulate the optimal interdiction problem as a game in which an attacker acts as the
player who goes first and, subject to budget constraints, fails the most critical nodes at time 0 so
as to maximize the total travel time of the mass. A centralized network operator then acts as the
player who goes second and, subject to the dynamics (6.1)–(6.3), routes the mass so as to minimize
its total travel time.
The optimal interdiction problem

maximize
κ

min

x,y,z,f,w

Pt

t=0


lT x(t) − γ card(ψ − κ),

(6.4)

where the inner minimum is taken over the governing dynamics (6.1)–(6.3), given initial conditions x(0), y(0), z(0), and prescribed on-ramp flows. The outer maximization is performed over
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κi ∈ {0, ψi } and q T κ ≥ d. The cardinality function card(·) counts the number of nonzero entries
of its vector argument and γ is a non-negative scalar that characterizes the relative importance of
the two terms in the objective. Here, the cardinality term serves to additionally enforce a sparse set
of failures, i.e., to promote the sparsity of the vector ψ − κ.

6.3

Formal statement of optimal interdiction & its reformulation as bilinear program

In this section we mathematically formulate optimal interdiction as a max-min problem with a
linear objective and linear constraints. We then employ duality to obtain an equivalent formulation
as a maximization problem with a bilinear objective and linear constraints.
Stacking the optimization variables x(t), y(t), z(t), f (t), w(t) into the vector u(t), and stacking
u(1), u(2), . . . , u(t) to form the vector u,
We state optimal interdiction problem as
maximize minimize pT u
κ

subject to

u

Au = b, Gu ≤ Hκ + h

(6.5)

0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, q T κ ≥ d
where A, b, G, H, h, p are appropriately defined matrices and vectors. Here, we have relaxed each
of the constraints κi ∈ {0, ψi } to 0 ≤ κi ≤ ψi and have eliminated the cardinality term that was
present in (6.4). However, we will demonstrate in the next section that the solution to (6.5) is
indeed sparse and that all but (at most) one of the κi belong to {0, ψi }. This is the main theoretical
contribtuion of this work.
We next employ duality as in [1] to turn the max-min problem (6.5) into a standard maximiza-
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tion problem. Problem (6.5) is equivalent to
maximize −bT ν − hT λ − λT Hκ
κ,λ,ν

subject to AT ν + GT λ = −p, λ ≥ 0

(6.6)

0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, q T κ ≥ d
ν : dual variables corresponding to the equality constraint and λ respectively are the dual variables
corresponding to the equality and first inequality constraints in (6.5). The objective function in
(6.6) is bilinear in the variables λ and κ and is therefore nonconcave. In general it is intractable
to find the global maximum of a nonconcave function. In the next section we propose an effective
numerical method to solve (6.6), which is the main algorithmic contribution of this work. For
small examples, where an exhaustive search is feasible, we demonstrate that the solution found by
our algorithm is the same as the globally optimal solution.

6.4

Guaranteed sparsity and binary property of failures

Proposition 3. When the budget is not enough to fail all cells, there is an optimal solution of
maximize −bT ν − hT λ − λT Hκ
κ,λ,ν

subject to AT ν + GT λ = −p, λ ≥ 0

(6.7)

0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, q T κ = d
that solves (6.6). Furthermore, this solution has the property that all but (at most) one of the κi
belong to {0, ψi }.
P ROOF : See Appendix D.
Proposition 3 demonstrates the sparsity of optimal failures. The attacker orders the nodes in
terms of their importance, as determined by (A.20)–(A.21), and fails them fully in descending
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order of importance until he has exhausted his budget. Since it is only meaningful that the attacker
has limited resources/budget, this results in a sparse set of failed nodes.

6.5

Proposed method for solving problem (6.7)

This section contains our main algorithmic results. We solve the bilinear problem by iteratively
updating one set of variables through a gradient-based step and then finding the globally optimal
solution in the other set of variables. And our numerical experiments demonstrate that our approach
performs better in comparison with methods reported in earlier work [1].
Although the objective function of problem (6.7) is bilinear in the variables, but the constraints
on κ and {λ, ν} are independent. If we fix one set of variables and solve for the other, we can
decompose problem (6.7) into two linear programs
maximize −λT Hκ
κ

(6.8)

subject to 0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, q T κ = d
and
maximize −bT ν − hT λ − λT Hκ
λ,ν

(6.9)
T

T

subject to A ν + G λ = −p, λ ≥ 0.
In our experiments we find that if we update the variables by iteratively solving linear programs
(6.8) and (6.9) we rapidly converge to a sub-optimal solution of problem (6.7), which inhibits the
search for the global optimum.
Motivated by block coordinate gradient descent (BCGD) and block coordinate descent (BCD)
[149], we aim to solve problem (6.7) by iterating between updating κ using a gradient-based step
and finding the globally optimal solution of {λ, ν}. Generally, projected gradient descent is used
as the one-step update for a constraint problem, which first employs gradient descent to update the
variable and then obtains its Euclidean projection onto the constraint set. In this chapter we use
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the adaptive moment estimation (Adam) algorithm [151] instead of gradient descent in the update
of κ. We will refer to this procedure as the projected Adam algorithm.
The Adam algorithm adds bias-correction terms based on the root mean square prop (RMSProp) [152] and the adaptive gradient (Adagrad) [153] algorithms, and it is demonstrated to be
robust and well-suited to a wide range of convex and non-convex problems [151]. In the case of
solving (6.7), the momentum term in Adam helps us avoid early convergence to a sub-optimal
point. In our experiments, we observe that when we use the projected Adam algorithm our solutions are much better than those found by projected gradient descent.
To begin, we use the fact that maximizing the objective function of problem (6.8) over κ is
equivalent to
minimize λT Hκ.
κ

(6.10)

In our projected Adam algorithm, we first use Adam to update κ, for which we compute
g (k+1) =

∂(λT Hκ)
= H T λ,
∂κ

ρ(k+1) = β1 ρ(k) + (1 − β1 )g (k+1) ,
σ (k+1) = β2 σ (k) + (1 − β2 )g (k+1) ◦ g (k+1) ,
ρ̂(k+1) =

ρ(k+1)
σ (k+1)
(k+1)
,
σ̂
=
,
1 − β1k+1
1 − β2k+1

with the update of κ given by

κ(k+1) = κ(k) −

(k+1)

√ η ρ̂
,
σ̂ (k+1) +1

(6.11)

where ◦ denotes element-wise vector multiplication and division by vectors is performed elementwise;  is a parameter with small values to prevent division by zero (generally chosen to be 10−8 ),
the initial values of ρ(0) and σ (0) is zero, and the parameters β1 and β2 respectively are chosen to
be 0.9 and 0.999; 1 is the column vector of all ones and η is the step size of the Adam algorithm.
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Next we find the Euclidean projection of κ(k+1) onto the constraint set by solving the linear
program
minimize
κ

kκ − κ(k+1) k22
(6.12)
T

subject to 0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, q κ = d.
In every iteration, after solving (6.12) we use κ(k+1) to denote the solution of (6.12) rather than the
result of (6.11). We then set κ = κ(k+1) in problem (6.9) and solve the linear program to obtain
{λ(k+1) , ν (k+1) }. This concludes one iteration of our algorithm.
Algorithm 7 Our proposed algorithm to solve problem (6.7)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

initialize λ(0)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , kmax do
Set λ = λ(k) , find κ(k+1) using projected Adam algorithm (6.11)–(6.12).
Set κ = κ(k+1) , find {λ(k+1) , ν (k+1) } by solving linear program (6.9).
end for
Algorithm 7 summarizes our proposed iterative method for solving problem (6.7). In our ex-

periments we observe that the number of needed iterations is reduced if we initialize λ(0) using
the sub-optimal solution found by solving linear programs (6.8) and (6.9) iteratively, instead of a
using a random point in the constraint set. The details of the initialization of λ(0) is discussed in
Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 8 Initialization of λ(0)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:

given κ(0) = ψ
for i = 0, 1, . . . , imax do
(i)
Solve problem (6.9) to find λ(i) and ν (i) , set J1 as value of objective function.
(i)
Solve problem (6.8) to find κ(i+1) , set J2 as value of objective function.
(i)
(i−1)
(i)
(i)
if J1 = J2
and J2 = J1 then
Break for loop.
end if
end for
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6.6

Numerical results

In this section we illustrate the utility of Algorithms 7 and 8 for solving problem (6.7). Our numerical experiments also validate the theoretical results in Section 6.4. For all linear programs we
use CVXPY [154, 155], a tool for convex programming in Python. We implement Adam algorithm
(6.11) in Tensorflow [156]. We apply our approach to two different networks and compare the
results with those in [1].

6.6.1

Example 1

We evaluate the utility of our approach using the network shown in Figure 6.1, which is taken
from [1]. We prescribe that at each time step 2 units of mass enter nodes 1 and 9 through their
respective on-ramps. Node 11 is the sink cell. We take φ = 1.2 ψ and t = 12. The cost, flowcapacity, and initial mass vectors respectively are given by
T



c = 3, 2, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 1, 3, 2

T
3
3
3
ψ = 4, 3, 2 , 3, 3, 2 , 3, 2 , 4, 3
T
x(0) = 2, 1, 1, 1, 21 , 12 , 12 , 21 , 2, 2 .


e
1
3
5

Our method

URI [1]

BRI [1]

Exhaustive search

Failures
3
3,6,8
3,6,8,10

Failures
3
3,6,8
3,6,8,10

Failures
3
3,6,8
3,6,8,10

Failures
3
3,6,8
3,6,8,10

Table 6.1: Comparison of different numerical algorithms for network in Figure 6.1.

Table 6.1 shows that for budgets e = 1, 3, 5 both our numerical method and that proposed in [1]
successfully find the globally optimal attack (obtained through exhaustive search).
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Fig. 6.1: Network from [1]

6.6.2

Example 2

As a second example we use the network shown in Figure 6.2, which is a traffic network adapted
by [1] from [2]. We prescribe that at each time step 2 units of mass enter nodes 1,4 and 1 unit
of mass enter node 3, all through their respective on-ramps. Node 18 is the sink cell. We take
φ = 1.2 ψ and t = 12. The cost, flow-capacity, and initial mass vectors respectively are given by
T



c = 3, 2, 2, 3, 2, 2, 3, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, 1, 3, 2

T
ψ = 6, 3, 3, 6, 3, 3, 5, 5, 3, 3, 3, 3, 5, 5, 2, 5, 3
T
x(0) = 2, 3, 23 , 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 2, 2, 32 , 2, 2, 2, 2 .


e
3
4
6

Our method

URI [1]

BRI [1]

Exhaustive search

Failures
15,17
15,17
15,16,17

Failures
15, (16)
15, (16)
15,16,17

Failures
15, (16)
15, (16)
15,16,17

Failures
15,17
15,17
15,16,17

Table 6.2: Comparison of different numerical algorithms for network in Figure 6.2.

Table 6.2 shows that for budget e = 6 both our numerical method and that in [1] find the
globally optimal attack (obtained through exhaustive search). In this case, the budget is enough to
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Fig. 6.2: Network from [1] based on [2, Chap. 19].

fully block the network; it is clear that failing nodes 15,16,17 is optimal since these failures prevent
any mass from leaving the network. For e = 3, 4 the problem is more challenging, as the budget
is no longer enough to fully block the network. Still, our proposed approach successfully finds the
globally optimal attack whereas the method in [1] does not.

6.7

Summary

In this chapter, we study the interdiction problem for transportation networks. We prove that the
solution to the optimal interdiction problem is both sparse and binary even without any sparsity
regularization or constraints in the formulation. We also propose a numerical method to solve the
bilinear network interdiction problem and find globally optimal solutions in the small networks we
tested.
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C HAPTER 7

C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE R ESEARCH
D IRECTIONS

7.1

Summary

In this dissertation, we discuss the mathematical optimization algorithms for model compression
and adversarial learning on DNNs. For model compression, we introduce two different methods.
The first method is based on hard constraint, in which the pruning rate in each layer need to be
determined at the time when the problem is formulated. The second method is based on soft regularization, in which the pruning rate in each layer can be determined based on the distribution of
weights after convergence. For the above two methods, the first one works better if the users have
specific requirements on the size of part or all layers. And otherwise the second one is preferable.
For adversarial learning, we propose an adversarial attack generation method via convex programming, which works for the DNNs with piecewise linear activation functions. such as ReLU. And
we propose a unified min-max optimization framework for the adversarial attack and defense on
DNNs over multiple domains.
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7.2
7.2.1

Future research directions
Efficient and robust neural architecture search

Neural architecture search (NAS) is an approach for automating the design of artificial neural
networks [157]. NAS has been applied to search for the architecture of DNNs which work well for
specific tasks. It would be highly desirable to use NAS to search for the DNN architecture which
is efficient for hardware implementation and robust to adversarial attacks. By combining the NAS
for efficient and robust DNN architecture with weight pruning and adversarial training, we can
further improve the implementation efficiency and adversarial robustness of DNNs.

7.2.2

Adversarial learning on graph neural networks

Graph neural networks which apply deep neural networks to graph data have achieved great performance on different tasks, such as traffic speed forecasting [158]. However, the prior works
rarely discuss the robustness of graph neural networks. In our work, we propose to evaluate the
robustness of graph neural networks on traffic speed prediction when some links in the graph of
road networks are removed. First, we propose an algorithm to search the links which are sensitive
to the traffic speed prediction. When we constraint the total number of links can be removed from
the graph, removing the sensitive links searched by our method leads to much higher prediction
error compared with randomly removing the same amount of links.
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A PPENDIX A

A PPENDIX

A.1

Proof of Proposition 1, Chapter 4

We need to demonstrate that when condition (4.5) holds, the optimal solution of the convex problem (4.2) satisfies all the constraints in problem (4.1).
(k+1)

Recall that x(k+1) , yi

, z(k+1) denote the solution of (4.2) at iteration k. Since the solution

satisfies the constraints, in particular we have
(k+1)

= a1 ◦ (W1 x(k+1) + b1 ),

(k+1)

= ai ◦ (Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1.

y1
yi
(k+1)

From ai

(k)

(k)

(k+1)

(k)

= ai , we conclude that
(k+1)

= a1

(k+1)

= ai

y1
yi

(k+1)

◦ (W1 x(k+1) + b1 ),

(A.1)

(k+1)

◦ (Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1.

(k+1)

(A.2)

[k]

(k+1)

According to (A.1) and the definition of y1 we can derive that y1
[k]

(k+1)

(A.2), the definition of y2 , and y1

[k+1]

= y1

(k+1)

, we obtain y2

[k+1]

= y1
[k+1]

= y2

. Similarly, from

. This procedure can
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(k+1)

be continued to show that yi

[k+1]

= yi

for i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. Therefore, equation (A.2) is

equivalent to
(k+1)

yi

(k+1)

= ai

[k+1]

◦ (Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1.

(A.3)

(k)

Now, replacing k with k + 1 in the definition of ai , equations (A.1) and (A.3) are respectively
equivalent to
(k+1)

= σ(W1 x(k+1) + b1 ),

(k+1)

= σ(Wi yi−1 + bi ), i = 2, . . . , N − 1.

y1
yi

(k+1)

Recalling that the constraints involving z are the same in (4.1) and (4.2), the above argument im(k+1)

plies that x(k+1) , yi

, z(k+1) satisfy the constraints in (4.1) and therefore characterize a feasible

point. This completes the proof of the proposition.

A



Proof of Proposition 2, Chapter 5

`1 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve
minimize
δ

1
kδ
2

− ak22 + I[č,ĉ] (δ)

(A.4)

subject to kδk1 ≤ ,
where I[č,ĉ] (·) is the indicator function of the set [č, ĉ]. The Langragian of this problem is
1
L = kδ − ak22 + I[č,ĉ] (δ) + λ1 (kδk1 − )
2
d
X
1
=
( (δi − ai )2 + λ1 |δi | + I[či ,ĉi ] (δi )) − λ1 .
2
i=1

(A.5)
(A.6)
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The minimizer δ ∗ minimizes the Lagrangian, it is obtained by elementwise soft-thresholding

δi∗ = P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0}).

where xi is the ith element of a vector x, P[či ,ĉi ] (·) is the clip function over the interval [či , ĉi ].
The primal, dual feasibility and complementary slackness are

λ1 = 0, kδk1 =
or λ1 > 0, kδk1 =

d
X
i=1
d
X

|δi | =
|δi | =

i=1

d
X
i=1
d
X

|P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )| ≤ 

(A.7)

|P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0})| = .

(A.8)

i=1

Pd

|P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )| ≤ , δi∗ = P[či ,ĉi ] (ai ). Otherwise δi∗ = P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0}),
Pd
where λ1 is given by the root of the equation
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − λ1 , 0})| =
If

i=1

.

Bisection method can be used to solve the above equation for λ1 , starting with
Pd
the initial interval (0, maxi |ai | − /d]. Since
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − 0, 0})| =
Pd
Pd
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai ) max {|ai | − maxi |ai | + /d, 0})| ≤
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )| >  in this case, and
Pd
Pd
i=1 (/d) = .
i=1 |P[či ,ĉi ] (sign(ai )(/d))| ≤
`2 norm When we find the Euclidean projection of a onto the set X , we solve
minimize kδ − ak22 + I[č,ĉ] (δ)
δ

subject to

kδk22

(A.9)

2

≤ ,

where I[č,ĉ] (·) is the indicator function of the set [č, ĉ]. The Langragian of this problem is
L = kδ − ak22 + I[č,ĉ] (δ) + λ2 (kδk22 − 2 )
=

d
X
((δi − ai )2 + λ2 δi2 + I[či ,ĉi ] (δi )) − λ2 2 .
i=1

(A.10)
(A.11)
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The minimizer δ ∗ minimizes the Lagrangian, it is

δi∗ = P[či ,ĉi ] (

1
ai ).
λ2 + 1

The primal, dual feasibility and complementary slackness are

λ2 = 0, kδk22 =
or λ2 > 0, kδk22 =

d
X
i=1
d
X
i=1

δi2 =

d
X

(P[či ,ĉi ] (ai ))2 ≤ 2

(A.12)

i=1

δi2 = (P[či ,ĉi ] (

1
ai ))2 = 2 .
λ2 + 1

(A.13)



1
2
2
∗
∗
(P
(a
))
≤

,
δ
=
P
(a
).
Otherwise
δ
=
P
a
, where λ2 is
i
i
i
[č
,ĉ
]
[č
,ĉ
]
[č
,ĉ
]
i
i
i i
i i
i i
i=1
λ2 +1
P
given by the root of the equation di=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] ( λ21+1 ai ))2 = 2 . Bisection method can be used to
qP
d
2
solve the above equation for λ2 , starting with the initial interval (0,
i=1 (ai ) / − 1]. Since
Pd
Pd
Pd
1
1
2
2
2
2
i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] ( 0+1 ai )) =
i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] ( λ2 +1 ai )) =
i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] (ai )) >  in this case, and
q
q
Pd
Pd
Pd
Pd
2
2
2
2 2
2 2
i=1 (ai ) /(
i=1 (P[či ,ĉi ] (ai /
i=1 (ai ) )) ≤ 
i=1 (ai ) ) =  .
If

Pd

`0 norm For `0 norm in X , it is independent to the box constraint. So we can clip a to the box
constraint first, which is δi0 = P[či ,ĉi ] (ai ), and then project it onto `0 norm.
We find the additional Euclidean distance of every element in a and zero after they are clipped
to the box constraint, which is

p


a2i − (ai − či )2 ai < či



 p
ηi =
a2i − (ai − ĉi )2 ai > ĉi





 |ai |
otherwise.

(A.14)
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It can be equivalently written as

p


2ai či − č2i ai < či


 p
ηi =
2ai ĉi − ĉ2i ai > ĉi




 |ai |
otherwise.

(A.15)

To derive the Euclidean projection onto `0 norm, we find the -th largest element in η and call it
[η] . We keep the elements whose corresponding ηi is above or equals to -th, and set rest to zeros.
The closed-form solution is given by


 δ 0 ηi ≥ [η]
i
∗
δi =

 0 otherwise.

(A.16)



B

Proof of Theorem 1, Chapter 5

Note that the objective function of problem (5.4) is strongly concave w.r.t. w with parameter γ,
and has γ-Lipschitz continuous gradients. Moreover, we have kwk2 ≤ 1 due to w ∈ P. Using
these facts and [133, Theorem 1] or [159, Theorem 1] completes the proof.

C



Proof of Lemma 1, Chapter 5

Similar to (5.1), problem (5.13) is equivalent to

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize
w∈P

θ

K
X

wi Fi (θ).

(A.17)

i=1

Recall that Fi (θ) := maximizeδi ∈Xi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y), problem can then be written as

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize
θ

w∈P

K
X
i=1

[wi maximize ftr (θ, δi ; x, y)].
δi ∈Xi

(A.18)
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According to proof by contradiction, it is clear that problem (A.18) is equivalent to

minimize E(x,y)∈D maximize

K
X

w∈P,{δi ∈Xi }

θ

wi ftr (θ, δi ; x, y).

(A.19)

i=1



D

Proof of Proposition 3, Chapter 5.7

Problem (6.6) is equivalent to
maximize maximize −bT ν − hT λ − λT Hκ
κ

λ,ν

AT ν + GT λ = −p, λ ≥ 0

subject to

0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, cT (1 − κ/ψ) ≤ e
in which the inner maximization problem is
maximize −λT Hκ
κ

(A.20)
T

subject to 0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, c (1 − κ/ψ) ≤ e.
Setting ω T = λT H, and denoting the ith element of a vector a by ai , the last problem becomes
maximize −

P

κ

i ωi κi

subject to 0 ≤ κi ≤ ψi , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i ci (1

− κi /ψi ) ≤ e
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which is further equivalent to
maximize

P

i ωi (ψi

κ

− κi )

subject to 0 ≤ ψi − κi ≤ ψi , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i (ci /ψi )(ψi

− κi ) ≤ e.

Setting θi = ci /ψi and µi = ψi − κi the above problem can be rewritten as
maximize

P

i ωi µi

µ

subject to 0 ≤ µi ≤ ψi , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i θi µi

≤ e.

Since both ci and ψi are positive for every i then θi is positive for i = 1, 2, . . . and the last problem
is equivalent to
maximize

P

µ

i (ωi /θi )θi µi

subject to 0 ≤ θi µi ≤ θi ψi , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i θi µi

≤ e.

Setting τi = θi µi and recalling that θi ψi = ci , the above problem can be rewritten as
maximize
τ

P

i (ωi /θi )τi

subject to 0 ≤ τi ≤ ci , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i τi

(A.21)

≤ e.

It can be shown that all the elements of H in (6.5) are non-negative. Since the elements of
λ also are non-negative and ω T = λT H, it follows that the elements of ω are non-negative and
therefore ωi /θi is non-negative for i = 1, 2, . . .. This implies that the objective function in (A.21)
is monotonically non-decreasing in every τi .
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When the attack budget is not enough to fail all cells in the network, e <

P

i ci ,

from the

monotonically non-decreasing property we conclude that there is a solution of (A.21) that satisfies
P
T
i τi = e. Clearly this implies that there is a solution of (A.20) which satisfies c (1 − κ/ψ) = e,
or equivalently q T κ = d. This proves that there is an optimal solution of (6.7) that solves (6.6).
Moreover, when e <

P

i ci ,

we solve

maximize
τ

P

i (ωi /θi )τi

subject to 0 ≤ τi ≤ ci , i = 1, 2, . . .
P

i τi

=e

is given by finding the index i1 for which ωi /θi is largest among all i and setting τi1 = ci1 if ci1 ≤ e
and τi1 = e if ci1 > e. If ci1 ≤ e we proceed by finding the index i2 for which ωi /θi is secondlargest among all i and setting τi2 = ci2 if ci1 + ci2 ≤ e and τi2 = e − ci1 if ci1 + ci2 > e. This
P
procedure is repeated until i τi = e. Thus all but (at most) one of the τi belong to {0, ci }, with
those τi corresponding to the largest values of ωi /θi equal to ci and those τi corresponding to the
smallest values of ωi /θi equal to 0. This implies that for every λ ≥ 0 there is a solution of
maximize −λT Hκ
κ

subject to 0 ≤ κ ≤ ψ, cT (1 − κ/ψ) = e.
with the property that all but (at most) one of the κi belong to {0, ψi }, which in turn proves the
same property for problem (6.7). The proof of the proposition is now complete.
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